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13-007

Application of the NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services to a student with a disability

Appearances: 

Courtenaye Jackson-Chase, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, attorneys for petitioner, Lisa Khandhar, Esq., of counsel

Educational Advocacy Services, attorneys for respondent, Jennifer A. Tazzi, Esq., of counsel

Decision

I. Introduction

            This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the district) appeals from the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which found that it failed to offer an appropriate educational program to respondent's (the parent's) son and ordered it to reimburse the parent for her son's tuition costs at the Academy of Magen David for the 2011-12 school year.  The appeal must be sustained.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

            The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).  A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

            The parties' familiarity with the detailed facts and procedural history of the case and the IHO's decision is presumed and will not be recited here.   The Committee on Special Education (CSE) convened on March 1, 2011 to formulate the student's Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the 2011-12 school year (see generally Parent Ex. H).  The parent disagreed with the recommendations contained in the March 2011 IEP, as well as with the particular public school site to which the district assigned the student to attend for the 2011-12 school year and, as a result, notified the district of her intent to unilaterally place the student at the Academy at Magen David (see Parent Exs. C, D).  In a due process complaint notice dated May 7, 2012 the parent alleged for numerous reasons that the district failed to offer the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2011-12 school year and as relief sought the costs of the student's tuition from the district (see Parent Ex. A).

            An impartial hearing convened on October 16, 2012 and concluded on November 28, 2012 after two days of proceedings (Tr. pp. 1-112).  In a decision dated December 19, 2012, the IHO determined that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year, that the Academy at Magen David was an appropriate unilateral placement, and that equitable considerations weighed in favor of the parent's request for an award of tuition reimbursement (IHO Decision at p. 7).  As relief, the IHO ordered the district to reimburse the parent for 60 percent of the cost of the student's tuition at the Academy at Magen David for the 2011-12 school year, as 40 percent of the school day was determined to be devoted to religious instruction (IHO Decision at pp. 7-8).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

            The following issues presented on appeal must be resolved on appeal in order to render a decision in this case: (1) whether IHO erred in determining that the March 2011 CSE was not properly composed, and (2) whether IHO erred in determining that the March 2011 IEP was inadequate because it failed to provide any opportunities for academic mainstreaming.

V. Applicable Standards

            Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

            A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).  While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]; Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007]).  Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.H. v. Dep't of Educ., 394 Fed. App'x 718, 720, 2010 WL 3242234 [2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010]; E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 [N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008], aff'd, 361 Fed. App'x 156, 2009 WL 3326627 [2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009]; Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007], aff'd, 293 Fed. App'x 20, 2008 WL 3852180 [2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008]).

            The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]).  A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203).  However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).  The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).  Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).  Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]; Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15).  The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).  The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 [S.D.N.Y. 2010], aff'd, 486 Fed. App'x 954, 2012 WL 4946429 [2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012]; E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 [S.D.N.Y. 2009]; Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008]).

            An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]; Tarlowe v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008] [noting that a CSE must consider, among other things, the "results of the initial evaluation or most recent evaluation" of the student, as well as the "'academic, developmental, and functional needs'" of the student]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]; see also Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 07-018; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 06-059; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 06-029; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-046; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 02-014; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 01-095; Application of a Child Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 93-9).

            A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252).  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

            The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010]).

VI. Discussion

A. CSE Composition

            The parent asserts that the district's failure to ensure the attendance of the student's then-current teacher at the March 2011 CSE was a violation of the IDEA that denied the student a FAPE.  The IDEA requires a CSE to include, among others, one special education teacher of the student, or where appropriate, not less than one special education provider of the student (20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][B][ii]-[iii]; see 34 CFR 300.321[a][2]-[3]; 8 NYCRR 200.3[a][1][ii]-[iii]).  The Official Analysis of Comments to the federal regulations indicate that the special education teacher or provider "should" be the person who is or will be responsible for implementing the student's IEP (IEP Team, 71 Fed. Reg. 46670 [Aug. 14, 2006]).  The IDEA also requires a CSE to include, among others, not less than one regular education teacher of the student if the student is or may be participating in a general education environment (20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][B][ii]; see 34 CFR 300.321[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.3[a][1][ii]; see also E.A.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 W.L. 4571794, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2012]).  The regular education teacher "shall, to the extent appropriate, participate in the development of the IEP of the child, including the determination of appropriate positive behavioral interventions and supports and other strategies and supplementary aids and services, program modifications, and support for school personnel" (20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][3][C]; 34 CFR 300.324[a][3]; 8 NYCRR 200.3[d]).

            In this case, a review of the hearing record demonstrates that attendees at the March 2011 CSE meeting included: the parent, a parent advocate, an additional parent member, the speech/language coordinator from the student's then-current private school, the school psychologist, and the district representative who also participated as the special education teacher (Tr. pp. 20-22; Parent Ex. H at p. 2).  The record reflects that the district made efforts to secure the attendance of the student's then-current teacher for the March 2011 CSE meeting; however, the speech/language coordinator was sent as the representative from the private school (Tr. pp. 49-50).  The IHO concluded that the speech/language coordinator was sufficiently knowledgeable about the student to satisfy the role of a "special education teacher" or provider at the CSE meeting (IHO Decision at p. 6).

            The record is unclear with respect to the participation of a regular education teacher at the March 2011 CSE meeting (compare Tr. p.21, with Tr. pp. 48-49).  Although the IHO implied some displeasure at the notion of having one member of the CSE serving multiple roles, her decision is unclear as to whether she found that a lack of a regular education teacher at the March 2011 CSE meeting constituted an actual procedural violation in this case and, if so, the extent to which it contributed to her finding of a denial of a FAPE (IHO Decision at pp. 5-6).  Upon review I find that the district considered placing the student in a general education setting; consequently, the district was required to ensure that a regular education teacher of the student participated at the CSE meeting.  The evidence is insufficient for the district to clearly establish that a duly certified regular education teacher of the student participated in the CSE meeting, thus the district has failed to show that it met the procedural requirement.  However, the hearing record does not provide a basis to conclude that this procedural inadequacy impeded the student's right to a FAPE, significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits in this instance (see J.F. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 5984915, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2012] [concluding that even if a regular education teacher was a required CSE member, the lack of such a teacher did not render an IEP inappropriate when there was no evidence of any concerns during the CSE meeting that the regular education teacher was required to resolve and "no reason to believe" that such teacher was required to advise on lunch and recess modifications or support]; E.A.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 4571794, at *6-*7 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2012] [where the record supported a conclusion that a regular education teacher was required at the CSE meeting and it was possible that an appropriate regular education teacher under the IDEA was not present at the CSE meeting, the evidence did not show that the CSE composition rendered the IEP inadequate]).  It is further noted that the parent participated in the CSE meeting and was accompanied by a parent advocate, mitigating any harm that might have flowed from the procedural violation (Tr. pp. 22-23, 86; Parent Ex. H at p. 2).  Also of relevance to the potential harm, as further discussed below, the hearing record does not support the finding that based on what was contained in the March 2011 IEP that the CSE was required to provide more mainstreaming opportunities for this student.

B. Opportunity for Academic Mainstreaming

            On appeal, the district alleges that the IHO erred in addressing the issue of academic mainstreaming possibilities for the student because the student's participation with nondisabled peers was not fairly raised in the parent's due process complaint.  I agree.  The party requesting an impartial hearing has the first opportunity to identify the range of issues to be addressed at the hearing (Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-141; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 08-056).  A party requesting an impartial hearing may not raise issues at the impartial hearing that were not raised in its due process complaint notice unless the other party agrees (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][B]; 34 CFR 300.507[d][3][i], 300.511[d]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][1][ii]), or the original due process complaint is amended prior to the impartial hearing per permission given by the IHO at least five days prior to the impartial hearing (20 U.S.C. § 1415[c][2][E][i][II]; 34 CFR 300.507[d][3][ii]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[i][7][b]; B.P. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2012 WL 33984, at *4-*5 [E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012]; M.R. v. S. Orangetown Cent. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 6307563, at *12-*13 [S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011]).  After reviewing the due process complaint notice and for the reasons stated above, the due process complaint notice cannot be reasonably read to include this claim.  Accordingly, I find that the IHO erred in reaching this issue as a basis for finding a denial of FAPE, where as here one of the central points of the due process complaint notice was not that there were insufficient mainstreaming opportunities, but that the district failed to provide a sufficiently small special education environment (Parent Ex. A at p. 3).  Furthermore, even if this issue had been properly raised, the record reflects that the March 2011 CSE considered the student's academic and social-emotional needs and discussed the least restrictive environment (LRE) in determining the student's placement (Tr. pp. 24-35, 43-47; Parent Ex. H at pp. 3-7, 11-13).  I find that record supports that student's needs would have been appropriately addressed in 12:1 special class in a community school based upon the information before the CSE.[1]

VII. Conclusion

            In summary, having determined the IHO erred in concluding that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE due to insufficient LRE for the 2011-12 school year, the necessary inquiry is at an end and there is no need to reach the issues of whether the student's unilateral placement at the Academy of Magen David was an appropriate placement or whether equitable considerations supported the parent's requested relief (see Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370; M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 66 [2d Cir. 2000]).

            I have considered the remaining contentions and find it is unnecessary to address them in light of my determinations herein.

            THE APPEAL IS SUSTAINED.

            IT IS ORDERED that the IHO's decision dated December 19, 2012 is modified by reversing those portions which found that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year.

[1] With regard to the Newington test, removal from the general education environment was supported, and as for the next element, whether the student has been otherwise mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate, the IEP notes that the student will be placed in a special class for academic subjects, but shall be placed in a community school with whom he would participate during lunch, assemblies, trips, etc.; thus, the student would have would had been offered mainstreaming opportunities with non-disabled students despite being placed in a 12:1 special class setting (Parent Ex. H at pp. 1, 11, 13; see Newington, 546 F.3d 111).

Topical Index

CSE ProcessCSE Composition
District Appeal
Preliminary MattersScope of Hearing

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[1] With regard to the Newington test, removal from the general education environment was supported, and as for the next element, whether the student has been otherwise mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate, the IEP notes that the student will be placed in a special class for academic subjects, but shall be placed in a community school with whom he would participate during lunch, assemblies, trips, etc.; thus, the student would have would had been offered mainstreaming opportunities with non-disabled students despite being placed in a 12:1 special class setting (Parent Ex. H at pp. 1, 11, 13; see Newington, 546 F.3d 111).