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13-043

Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by his parent, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE WILLIAM FLOYD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT

Appearances: 

Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, attorneys for respondent, Howard M. Miller, Esq., and Emily E. Harper, Esq., of counsel

Decision

I. Introduction

            This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the parent) appeals from the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which found that respondent (the district) offered the student an appropriate program for the 2012-13 school year.  The appeal must be dismissed.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

            When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

            New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

            A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

            The student was the subject of a prior administrative proceeding and the parties' familiarity with the procedural history of the case and the IHO's decision is presumed and will not be recited here (see Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 12-029).[1]  On August 16, 2012, the CSE convened for an initial eligibility determination meeting and to formulate the student's IEP for the 2012-13 school year (Dist. Ex. G).[2]  For the 2012-13 school year, the August 2012 CSE deemed the student eligible for special education and related services as a student with autism, and recommended, among other things, a 12-month 6:1+1 special class and residential placement at the School for Adaptive and Integrated Learning (SAIL), which is located outside the district and which has been approved by the Commissioner of Education as a school with which school districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (Tr. pp. 9-11, 24-25, 59; Dist. Ex. G at pp. 1-2; see 8 NYCRR 200.1[d], 200.7).[3]  During the August 2012 CSE meeting, the parent disagreed with the recommendations contained in the resultant IEP, and indicated that she planned to pursue an impartial hearing (Dist. Ex. G at p. 2).[4]  On November 19, 2012, the parties convened an impartial hearing, which concluded after one day of testimony (Tr. pp. 1-80).[5]  In a decision dated February 19, 2013, the IHO found that the district met its obligations under the IDEA to secure placement of the student at SAIL, and dismissed the parent's due process complaint notice (IHO Decision at p. 5).  In addition, the IHO directed the CSE to convene within one month in order to amend the student's IEP to provide, if the parent and district were willing, for a two-month trial placement at SAIL, including any portion thereof that would be part of an extended school year (id. at p. 6).  The IHO further indicated that while the trial period at SAIL was a voluntary arrangement, he urged the parent to "consider it with utmost seriousness and to cooperate in its execution, understanding that this may be [her] last and most feasible chance to help [her] son prepare for the challenge that will occur only months from now when he will transition out of [the district]" (id. at p. 7).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

            The parties' familiarity with the particular issues for review on appeal in the parent's petition for review and the district's answer thereto is also presumed and will not be recited here.  The gravamen of the parties' dispute surrounds the appropriateness of the district's recommendation to place the student at SAIL for the 2012-13 school year.[6]

V. Applicable Standards

            Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

            A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).  While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]; Perricelli v. Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 465211, at *10 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007]).  Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.H. v. Dep't of Educ., 394 Fed. App'x 718, 720, 2010 WL 3242234 [2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010]; E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 3930028, at *7 [N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008], aff'd, 361 Fed. App'x 156, 2009 WL 3326627 [2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009]; Matrejek v. Brewster Cent. Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 [S.D.N.Y. 2007], aff'd, 293 Fed. App'x 20, 2008 WL 3852180 [2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008]).

            The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]).  A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203).  However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).  The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).  Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).  Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]; Perricelli, 2007 WL 465211, at *15).  The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).  The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; G.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 751 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573-80 [S.D.N.Y. 2010], aff'd, 486 Fed. App'x 954, 2012 WL 4946429 [2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012]; E.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 [S.D.N.Y. 2009]; Patskin v. Bd. of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008]).

            An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]; Tarlowe v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 2736027, at *6 [S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008] [noting that a CSE must consider, among other things, the "results of the initial evaluation or most recent evaluation" of the student, as well as the "'academic, developmental, and functional needs'" of the student]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]; see also Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 07-018; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 06-059; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 06-029; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-046; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 02-014; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 01-095; Application of a Child Suspected of Having a Disability, Appeal No. 93-9).

            A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252).  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

            The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; M.P.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2010 WL 3398256, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010]).

VI. Discussion

            Upon careful review, the hearing record reflects that the IHO, in a well-reasoned and well-supported decision, correctly reached the conclusion that the district offered the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2012-13 school year (see IHO Decision at pp. 5-6).  The IHO accurately recounted the facts of the case, addressed the majority of the specific issues identified at the impartial hearing, set forth the proper legal standard to determine whether the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2012-13 school year, and applied that standard to the facts at hand (id. at pp. 2-6).  The decision shows that the IHO carefully considered the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both parties, and further, that he weighed the evidence and properly supported his conclusions (id.).  Furthermore, an independent review of the entire hearing record reveals that the impartial hearing was conducted in a manner consistent with the requirements of due process and that there is no reason appearing in the hearing record to modify the determinations of the IHO (see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][2]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][2]).  Thus, the conclusions of the IHO are hereby adopted.

            In particular, a review of the hearing record supports the IHO's conclusion that SAIL constituted an appropriate placement for the student for the 2012-13 school year (IHO Decision at pp. 4-6).  Here, the parties do not dispute that the student requires residential placement in order to receive a FAPE; however, the parties disagree about the location of the residential placement (Tr. pp. 9, 17-18).  The hearing record reflects that at the time of the August 2012 CSE meeting, the student presented with moderate to severe autism and developmental delays (Tr. p. 23).  Psychological testing yielded results that indicated that the student's overall cognitive ability was in the extremely low range (Dist. Ex. G at p. 8).  He is also nonverbal, although the hearing record indicates that the student communicated minimally through signs that his family appeared to understand (id. at p. 9).  Additionally, the student had a longstanding record of aggressive behaviors (id. at p. 5).  The August 2012 IEP further reflected that based on anecdotes, accounts from service providers and observations, these behaviors occurred on a daily basis ranging from pushing/shoving to instances where service providers sought medical attention as a result of an assault (id.).  In light of the student's cognitive and behavioral needs, the student required 24-hour care and supervision, specifically, a small structured residential facility where his academic, language, social/emotional, behavioral and post-secondary goals could be monitored and addressed (see Tr. p. 50; Dist. Ex. G at p. 19).  Moreover, the student required a placement that would work on activities of daily living (ADL) skills, such as brushing teeth, combing hair, putting on and taking off clothing, and going to the bathroom (Tr. pp. 24-25).  Notwithstanding the parent's concerns regarding the location of SAIL and the composition of its student body, the hearing record also suggests that the district experienced difficulty securing a residential placement, particularly one in close proximity to the student's home that could address his special education needs (Tr. pp. 17-18; see Tr. pp. 35-36; see also Dist. Ex. G at p. 2).[7]

VII. Conclusion

            The hearing record supports the IHO's determinations that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2012-13 school year.  I have considered the parties' remaining contentions, and find that they are without merit.

            THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

[1] The administrative procedures applicable to the review of disputes between parents and school districts regarding any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student are well established and described in broader detail in previous decisions issued by the Office of State Review (e.g.Application of the Dep't of Educ., 12-228; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 12-087; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-165; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 09-092).

[2] Although the student had been previously deemed eligible for special education and related services, the district treated the matter as an initial referral to the CSE because the parent had revoked her right to services (Tr. p. 23; Dist. Ex. G at p. 2).

[3] The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with autism is not in dispute in this proceeding (see 34 CFR 300.8 [c][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][1]).

[4] The due process complaint notice was not formally offered into the hearing record.

[5] Although the hearing record does not reference the date, the IHO conducted a prehearing conference prior to the commencement of the impartial hearing, at which time the parties agreed that the main issue in dispute was the appropriateness of the district's program recommendation for the 2012-13 school year (Tr. pp. 5-7).

[6] In this proceeding, the parent raised the same objections to placement of the student at SAIL that she raised during the previous school year, and the parties previously litigated this claim with respect to the 2011-12 school year (Tr. p. 12; see generally Dist. Exs. A-F).

[7] Although I do not rely on this testimony in making my determination that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2012-13 school year, the district assistant director of the Special Education Department for secondary programs testified that regardless of the parent's continued objections to placement of the student at SAIL, the district would continue to apply to residential facilities within the area and that the student was on several waiting lists (Tr. pp. 41, 51).

Topical Index

Educational PlacementExtended Day/Home-Based/ Residential Services
Parent Appeal

PDF Version

[1] The administrative procedures applicable to the review of disputes between parents and school districts regarding any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student are well established and described in broader detail in previous decisions issued by the Office of State Review (e.g.Application of the Dep't of Educ., 12-228; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 12-087; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 12-165; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 09-092).

[2] Although the student had been previously deemed eligible for special education and related services, the district treated the matter as an initial referral to the CSE because the parent had revoked her right to services (Tr. p. 23; Dist. Ex. G at p. 2).

[3] The student's eligibility for special education and related services as a student with autism is not in dispute in this proceeding (see 34 CFR 300.8 [c][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][1]).

[4] The due process complaint notice was not formally offered into the hearing record.

[5] Although the hearing record does not reference the date, the IHO conducted a prehearing conference prior to the commencement of the impartial hearing, at which time the parties agreed that the main issue in dispute was the appropriateness of the district's program recommendation for the 2012-13 school year (Tr. pp. 5-7).

[6] In this proceeding, the parent raised the same objections to placement of the student at SAIL that she raised during the previous school year, and the parties previously litigated this claim with respect to the 2011-12 school year (Tr. p. 12; see generally Dist. Exs. A-F).

[7] Although I do not rely on this testimony in making my determination that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2012-13 school year, the district assistant director of the Special Education Department for secondary programs testified that regardless of the parent's continued objections to placement of the student at SAIL, the district would continue to apply to residential facilities within the area and that the student was on several waiting lists (Tr. pp. 41, 51).