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24-460

Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by his parent, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the New York City Department of Education

Appearances: 

The Law Office of Philippe Gerschel, attorneys for petitioner, by Philippe Gerschel, Esq.

Liz Vladeck, General Counsel, attorneys for respondent, by Ezra Zonana, Esq.

Decision

I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the parent) appeals from that part of a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which did not award funding for the full costs of services provided to her son by Little Apple Services, LLC (Little Apple) for the 2023-24 school year.  Respondent (the district) cross-appeals asserting that the IHO lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.  The appeal must be sustained.  The cross-appeal must be dismissed.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c).  The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  Incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

The parties' familiarity with this matter is presumed, and, therefore, the facts and procedural history of the case and the IHO's decision will not be recited in detail.  Briefly, a CSE convened on June 11, 2023, found the student eligible for special education as a student with an other health-impairment, and formulated an IESP for the student with a projected implementation date of June 26, 2023 (Parent Ex. B at p. 1).[1]  The CSE recommended that the student receive two 30-minute sessions per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), two 30-minute sessions per week of physical therapy (PT), and full-time individual, health paraprofessional services due to the student's severe allergy to dairy products and need for an EpiPen (id. at pp. 5-6).

On September 1, 2023, the parent signed a contract with the Little Apple for the full-time services of a paraprofessional in the student's school at a rate of $65 per hour for the 2023-24 school year, commencing on September 5, 2023 and continuing until June 28, 2024 (Parent Ex. C).[2]

A. Due Process Complaint Notice

In a due process complaint notice dated July 1, 2024, the parent alleged that the district failed to implement the services set forth in the student's June 2023 IESP for the "2022-23 [sic] school year" and that the parent could not locate providers (Parent Ex. A at p. 2).[3]  As relief, the parent requested a finding that the district denied the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) "for the 2022-23 [sic] school year," an order that the district fund the providers located by the parent at the provider's contracted rate, and an order that the district fund a bank of compensatory hours of related services for the portions of the school year which were not serviced, with such services funded at the prospective provider's contracted rate (id. at p. 3).

B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision

An impartial hearing convened before an IHO appointed by the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on August 14, 2024 (Tr. pp. 1-15).  At the impartial hearing, the parent's counsel clarified that the parent was only seeking relief in the form of $65 per hour for paraprofessional services and made a "correction on the record," without any opposition from the district, to reflect that the claim for services was for the 2023-24 school year and not the 2022-23 school year (Tr. pp. 4-6).  The parent submitted four exhibits, consisting of the due process complaint notice, the student's June 2023 IESP, the parent's contract with Little Appeal dated September 1, 2023, and the affidavit of the owner and administrator of Little Apple (Tr. pp. 6-7).  The parent's exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection (Tr. p. 7).  The district rested its case without submitting any documentary or testimonial evidence (id.).

In a decision dated September 12, 2024, the IHO held that it was undisputed that the district failed to implement the services recommended in the student's June 2023 IESP, and the IHO noted that the district did not submit any evidence to prove that it implemented the services (IHO Decision at pp. 3, 5).[4]

Next, the IHO held that the parent's requested rate of $65 per hour for paraprofessional services, "without benefits," was "exceptionally high" for a provider "whose sole role [was] to stand by with an EpiPen in the case of allergen exposure" (IHO Decision at p. 3).  The IHO summarized the testimony of the administrator of Little Apple who explained how the rate for services was calculated (id.).  The IHO discredited the administrator's testimony, determining that it was "doubtful" that a health paraprofessional "either receives or needs supervision, educational resources, or professional development" (id. at pp. 3-4).  Although the IHO noted that the district failed to present any evidence to indicate an appropriate rate for paraprofessional services, the IHO referenced the district's published rate for paraprofessionals is $27,000, which includes benefits (id. at p. 4).  Accordingly, the IHO determined that the parent's requested rate of $65 per hour was "objectively excessive" (id.).

The IHO also declined to apply a Burlington/Carter analysis and found the compensatory education standard more analogous as it "appropriately places the burden of proof for all issues on the district in non-tuition cases as per the plain language of Education Law §4404" (IHO Decision at p. 4).

In summary, the IHO held that, regardless of the standard to be applied, the district failed to put forth a defense and therefore failed to establish that the student was provided a FAPE for the 2023-24 school year (IHO Decision at p. 5).  The IHO also held that the rate charged by Little Apple was excessive and, even if it were revised downward to be in line with the district's paraprofessional rate, it would still be excessive because Little Apple does not appear to offer benefits to its employees (id.).  As relief, the IHO ordered the district to fund 40 hours per week of paraprofessional services by a paraprofessional chosen by the parent at a rate not to exceed $30 per hour, with the district to reimburse the parent or pay the providers within 45 days of submission of proof of payment or receipt of invoices for services rendered (id.).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

The parent appeals, alleging that the IHO erred in reducing the rate for the paraprofessional as the hearing record was devoid of any evidence of what the market typically commands for full-time paraprofessional services or that the rate set forth in the parent's contract with Little Apple exceeded what the market would typically command for these services.  The parent argues that the IHO's decision was arbitrary and based on her own unsubstantiated whim.  The parent requests that the IHO direct the district to fund the paraprofessional services at the contracted rate of $65 per hour.

Although not raising the argument before the IHO, as a cross-appeal, the district alleges that the IHO lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the parent's claims.  In the alternative, the district argues in its answer that the IHO properly reduced the rate established by the parent's contract with Little Apple because it was objectively excessive.

V. Applicable Standards

A board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][1][A]; Educ. Law § 4402[2][a], [b][2]).  However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services upon students who are enrolled by their parents in nonpublic schools (see 34 CFR 300.137[a]).  Although districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process for making special education services available to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, such students are not individually entitled under the IDEA to receive some or all of the special education and related services they would receive if enrolled in a public school (see 34 CFR 300.134, 300.137[a], [c], 300.138[b]).

However, under State law, parents of a student with a disability who have privately enrolled their child in a nonpublic school may seek to obtain educational "services" for their child by filing a request for such services in the public school district of location where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]).[5]  "Boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]).  In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district (id.).[6]  Thus,  under State law an eligible New York State resident student may be voluntarily enrolled by a parent in a nonpublic school, but at the same time the student is also enrolled in the public school district, that is dually enrolled, for the purpose of receiving special education programming under Education Law § 3602-c, dual enrollment services for which a public school district may be held accountable through an impartial hearing.

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir. 2012]).

VI. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

At the outset it is necessary to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised by the district for the first time in this appeal.  The district argues that federal law confers no right to file a due process complaint regarding services recommended in an IESP and New York law confers no right to file a due process complaint regarding IESP implementation.  Thus, according to the district, IHOs and SROs lack subject matter jurisdiction with respect to pure IESP implementation claims.

Recently in several decisions, the undersigned and other SROs have rejected the district's position that IHOs and SROs lack subject matter jurisdiction to address claims related to implementation of equitable services under State law (see, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-501; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-498; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-435; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-404; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-392; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-391; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-390; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-388; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-386).

Under federal law, all districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process with nonpublic schools located within the district and develop a services plan for the provision of special education and related services to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools within the district equal to a proportionate amount of the district's federal funds made available under part B of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][A]; 34 CFR 300.132[b], 300.134, 300.138[b]).  However, the services plan provisions under federal law clarify that "[n]o parentally-placed private school child with a disability has an individual right to receive some or all of the special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in a public school" (34 CFR 300.137 [a]).  Additionally, the due process procedures, other than child-find, are not applicable for complaints related to a services plan developed pursuant to federal law.  Accordingly, the district's argument under federal law is correct; however, the student did not merely have a services plan developed pursuant to federal law and the parent did not argue that the district failed in the federal consultation process or in the development of a services plan pursuant to federal regulations.

Separate from the services plan envisioned under the IDEA, the Education Law in New York has afforded parents of resident students with disabilities with a State law option that requires a district of location to review a parental request for dual enrollment services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).[7]  Education Law § 3602-c, concerning students who attend nonpublic schools, provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent, guardian or persons legally having custody of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of section forty-four hundred four of this chapter" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  It further provides that "[d]ue process complaints relating to compliance of the school district of location with child find requirements, including evaluation requirements, may be brought by the parent or person in parental relation of the student pursuant to section forty-four hundred four of this chapter" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][c]).  Education Law § 4404 concerning appeal procedures for students with disabilities, and consistent with the IDEA, provides that a due process complaint may be presented with respect to "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the student or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student" (Educ. Law § 4410[1][a]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]).  State Review Officers have in the past, taking into account the legislative history of Education Law § 3602-c, concluded that the legislature did not intend to eliminate a parent's ability to challenge the district's implementation of equitable services under Education Law § 3602-c through the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404 (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068).[8]  In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has explained that students authorized to receive services pursuant to Education Law § 3602-c are considered part-time public school students under State Law (Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 184 [1988]), which further supports the conclusion that part-time public school students are entitled to the same legal protections found in the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404.

However, the number of due process cases involving the dual enrollment statute statewide, which were minuscule in number until only a handful of years ago, have now increased to tens of thousands of due process proceedings per year within certain regions of this school district in the last several years.  Public agencies are attempting to grapple with how to address this colossal change in circumstances, which is a matter of great significance in terms of State policy.  Policy makers have attempted to address the issue.

In May 2024, the State Education Department proposed amendments to 8 NYCRR 200.5 "to clarify that parents of students who are parentally placed in nonpublic schools do not have the right under Education Law § 3602-c to file a due process complaint regarding the implementation of services recommended on an IESP" (see "Proposed Amendment of Section 200.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education Relating to Special Education Due Process Hearings," SED Mem. [May 2024], available at https://www.regents.nysed.gov/sites/regents/files/524p12d2revised.pdf).  Ultimately, however, the proposed regulation was not adopted.  Instead, in July 2024, the Board of Regents adopted, by emergency rulemaking, an amendment of 8 NYCRR 200.5 which provides that a parent may not file a due process complaint notice in a dispute "over whether a rate charged by a licensed provider is consistent with the program in a student's IESP or aligned with the current market rate for such services" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]).  The amendment to the regulation does not apply to the present circumstance for two reasons.  First, the amendment to the regulation applies only to due process complaint notices filed on or after July 16, 2024 (id.).[9]  Second, since its adoption, the amendment has been enjoined and suspended in an Order Show Cause dated October 4, 2024 (Agudath Israel of America v. New York State Bd. of Regents, No. 909589-24 [Sup. Ct., Albany County, Oct. 4, 2024]).  Specifically, the Order provides that:

pending the hearing and determination of Petitioners' application for a preliminary injunction, the Revised Regulation is hereby stayed and suspended, and Respondents, their agents, servants, employees, officers, attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, are temporarily enjoined and restrained from taking any steps to (a) implement the Revised Regulation, or (b) enforce it as against any person or entity

(Order to Show Cause, O'Connor, J.S.C., Agudath Israel of America, No. 909589-24).[10]

According to the district, however, the aforesaid rule making activities support its position that parents never had a right under State law to bring a due process complaint regarding implementation of an IESP or to seek relief in the form of enhanced rate services.  Consistent with the district's position, State guidance issued in August 2024 noted that the State Education Department had previously "conveyed" to the district that:

parents have never had the right to file a due process complaint to request an enhanced rate for equitable services or dispute whether a rate charged by a licensed provider is consistent with the program in a student's IESP or aligned with the current market rate for such services.  Therefore, such claims should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, whether they were filed before or after the date of the regulatory amendment.

("Special Education Due Process Hearings - Rate Disputes," Office of Special Educ. [Aug. 2024]).[11]

Given the implementation date set forth in the amendment's text and the temporary suspension of its application, the amendment may not be deemed to apply to the present matter.  Further, the position set forth in the guidance document issued in the wake of the emergency regulation, which is now enjoined and suspended, does not convince me that the Education Law may be read to divest IHOs and SROs of jurisdiction over these types of disputes.  Acknowledging that this matter has received new attention from State policymakers and appears to be an evolving situation, I nevertheless must deny the district's request for dismissal of the parent's appeal and underlying claim on jurisdictional grounds.

B. Scope of Review

In this matter, the student has been parentally placed in a nonpublic school and the parent does not seek tuition reimbursement from the district for the cost of the parental placement.  Instead, the parent alleged that the district failed to implement the student's mandated public special education services under the State's dual enrollment statute for the 2023-24 school year and, as a self-help remedy, she unilaterally obtained private paraprofessional services from Little Appeal for the student without the consent of the school district officials, and then commenced due process to obtain remuneration for the costs thereof.  Generally, districts that fail to comply with their statutory mandates to provide special education can be made to pay for special education services privately obtained for which a parent paid or became legally obligated to pay, a process that is essentially the same as the federal process under IDEA.  Accordingly, the issue in this matter is whether the parent is entitled to public funding of the costs of the private services.  "Parents who are dissatisfied with their child's education can unilaterally change their child's placement . . . and can, for example, pay for private services, including private schooling.  They do so, however, at their own financial risk.  They can obtain retroactive reimbursement from the school district after the [IESP] dispute is resolved, if they satisfy a three-part test that has come to be known as the Burlington-Carter test" (Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 526 [2d Cir. 2020] [internal quotations and citations omitted]; see Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 [1993] [finding that the "Parents' failure to select a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement."]).

The parent's request for district funding of privately-obtained services must be assessed under this framework.  Thus, a board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services they obtained for a student if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Carter, 510 U.S. 7; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 [2d Cir. 2009]).[12]  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 111 [2d Cir. 2007]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

Turning to the merits, I note that neither party appeals the IHO's finding that the district failed to offer a FAPE or implement equitable services for the 2023-24 school year.  Therefore, these unappealed determinations have become final and binding on the parties and will not be reviewed on appeal (34 CFR 300.514[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]; see Bd. of Educ. of the Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist. v. C.S., 2024 WL 4252499, at *12-*15 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2024]; M.Z. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1314992, at *6-*7, *10 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013]).

Nor does either party appeal the IHO's failure to render a determination with respect to the appropriateness of the unilateral services obtained by the parent.  Although in its answer the district briefly references that the IHO erred in failing to apply the Burlington/Carter standard and render a determination with respect to the appropriateness of the parent's unilaterally-obtained services, the district does not separately identify them as grounds for its cross-appeal, nor does the district present any argument on its position with respect to these two issues.  Pursuant to State regulations, an answer or answer and cross-appeal must provide "a clear and concise statement of the issues presented for review and the grounds for reversal or modification to be advanced, with each issue numbered and set forth separately, and identifying the precise rulings, failures to rule, or refusals to rule presented for review" (8 NYCRR 279.8[c][2]).  Thus, as the district failed to sufficiently appeal these rulings or failures to rule by the IHO, such issues are deemed abandoned and will not be further discussed (see 8 NYCRR 279.8[c]; Davis v. Carranza, 2021 WL 964820, at *12 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021] [upholding an SRO's conclusions that several claims had been abandoned by the petitioner]).

C. Equitable Considerations

The remaining issue to be resolved on appeal is whether the IHO erred in reducing the rate of the paraprofessional services delivered to the student by Little Apple.  The final criterion for a reimbursement award is that the parents' claim must be supported by equitable considerations.  Equitable considerations are relevant to fashioning relief under the IDEA (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; R.E., 694 F.3d at 185, 194; M.C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 68 [2d Cir. 2000]; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required.  Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"]; L.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 674 Fed. App'x 100, 101 [2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2017]).  With respect to equitable considerations, the IDEA also provides that reimbursement may be reduced or denied when parents fail to raise the appropriateness of an IEP in a timely manner, fail to make their child available for evaluation by the district, or upon a finding of unreasonableness with respect to the actions taken by the parents (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][iii]; 34 CFR 300.148[d]; E.M. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 461 [2d Cir. 2014] [identifying factors relevant to equitable considerations, including whether the withdrawal of the student from public school was justified, whether the parent provided adequate notice, whether the amount of the private school tuition was reasonable, possible scholarships or other financial aid from the private school, and any fraud or collusion on the part of the parent or private school]; C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 840 [2d Cir. 2014] [noting that "[i]mportant to the equitable consideration is whether the parents obstructed or were uncooperative in the school district's efforts to meet its obligations under the IDEA"]).

Among the factors that may warrant a reduction in tuition based on equitable considerations is whether the frequency of the services or the cost for the services was excessive (M.C., 226 F.3d at 68; see Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 ["Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that should be required.  Total reimbursement will not be appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was unreasonable"]; L.K., 674 Fed. App'x at 101; E.M., 758 F.3d at 461 [noting that whether the amount of the private school tuition was reasonable is one factor relevant to equitable considerations]).  The IHO may consider evidence regarding whether the rate charged by the private school or agency was unreasonable or regarding any segregable costs charged by the private school or agency that exceed the level that the student required to receive a FAPE (see L.K. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2016 WL 899321, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016], aff'd in part, 674 Fed. App'x 100).

An excessive cost argument focuses on whether the rate charged for a service was reasonable and requires, at a minimum, evidence of not only the rate charged by the unilateral placement, but evidence of reasonable market rates for the same or similar services.  In the instant matter, the district contends that the IHO's reduction of the rate should be upheld because the costs were excessive.  The parent argues that the district did not offer documentary or testimonial evidence regarding the costs of the unilaterally-obtained services, and that a rate cannot be considered excessive based on the unsubstantiated whim of the IHO.  The parent's argument has merit.  Notably, as the IHO found in her decision, at no time during the impartial hearing did the district offer any evidence about the reasonableness of the rate (see IHO Decision at p. 4).  The IHO determined that the rate was "objectively excessive" and "exceptionally high" based in part on her "doubt[ing]" the testimony from the administrator of Little Apple that a paraprofessional requires continuing education and professional development on the administration of an EpiPen (id. at pp. 3-5).[13]  The IHO further justified a reduction of the rate based on her independent finding of the district's published rate for paraprofessionals and because Little Apple does not "offer benefits to its employees" (id. at pp. 4-5).

An IHO is not permitted to rely on her own knowledge of market rates (i.e., judicial notice).[14]  Here, the IHO's reliance on the district's published rate for paraprofessionals without any citation in the decision or advanced notice to the parties also offends State regulation, which requires, in part, that an IHO's decision "shall be based solely upon the record of the proceeding before the [IHO]" (8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]).  Thus, the hearing record is devoid of any evidence concerning the reasonableness of the rate or current market rates for comparable private paraprofessionals.  Accordingly, there was not a sufficient record basis for a reduction in the rate specified in the contract due to a finding that it was excessive and the parent is, therefore, entitled to reimbursement at the contracted rate.

VII. Conclusion

Having determined that the IHO erred in reducing the award as there was insufficient basis in the hearing record to reduce the amount awarded based on equitable considerations, the necessary inquiry is at an end.

THE APPEAL IS SUSTAINED.

THE CROSS-APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

IT IS ORDERED that the IHO's decision dated September 12, 2024, as corrected on October 11, 2024, is modified such that the district shall directly fund the costs of the student's paraprofessional services delivered by Little Apple during the 2023-24 school year at the contracted rate of $65.00 per hour.

 

[1] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with an other health-impairment is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][9]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][10]).

[2] Little Apple has not been approved by the Commissioner of Education as an agency or school with which districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (see 8 NYCRR 200.1[d], 200.7).

[3] The due process complaint notice indicated that the student was parentally placed at a private school for the 2022-23 school year (Parent Ex. A at p. 1).

[4] A corrected decision was issued on October 11, 2024 amending the case number in the header at pages 2-9 and including the signature of the IHO (see Oct. 11, 2024 IHO Decision at pp. 2-9).  The September 12, 2024 decision is otherwise unaltered (compare Sept. 12, 2024 IHO Decision, with Oct. 11, 2024 IHO Decision).  For appeal purposes, the parent was required to timely serve a request for review upon the district as calculated from the IHO's September 12, 2024 final decision and did so in this instance.

[5] State law provides that "services" includes "education for students with disabilities," which means "special educational programs designed to serve persons who meet the definition of children with disabilities set forth in [Education Law § 4401(1)]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[1][a], [d]).

[6] State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007–Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c," Attachment 1 (Questions and Answers), VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available at https://www.nysed.gov/special-education/guidance-parentally-placed-nonpublic-elementary-and-secondary-school-students).  The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.).  The guidance has recently been reorganized on the State's web site and the paginated pdf versions of the documents previously available do not currently appear there, having been updated with web based versions.

[7] This provision is separate and distinct from the State's adoption of statutory language effectuating the federal requirement that the district of location "expend a proportionate amount of its federal funds made available under part B of the individuals with disabilities education act for the provision of services to students with disabilities attending such nonpublic schools" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2-a]).

[8] The district did not seek judicial review of these decisions.

[9] A statutory or regulatory amendment is generally presumed to have prospective application unless there is clear language indicating retroactive intent (see Ratha v. Rubicon Res., LLC, 111 F.4th 946, 963-69 [9th Cir. 2024]).  The presence of a future effective date typically suggests that the amendment is intended to apply prospectively, not retroactively (see People v. Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 203 [2022]).  The due process complaint notice in the present matter is dated July 1, 2024, prior to the July 16, 2024 effective date of the emergency regulation (see Parent Ex. A), which regulation has since lapsed.

[10] On November 1, 2024, Supreme Court issued a second order clarifying that the temporary restraining order applied to both emergency actions and activities involving permanent adoption of the rule until the petition was decided.

[11] Neither the guidance nor the district indicated if this jurisdictional viewpoint was conveyed publicly or only privately to the district, when it was communicated, or to whom.  There was no public expression of these points that the undersigned was aware of until policymakers began rulemaking activities in May 2024; however, as the number of allegations began to mount that the district's CSEs had not been convening and services were not being delivered, at that point the district began to respond by making unsuccessful jurisdictional arguments to SRO's in the past, which decisions were subject to judicial review but went unchallenged (see e.g.Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121).  The guidance document is no longer available on the State's website; thus a copy of the August 2024 rate dispute guidance has been added to the administrative hearing record.

[12] State law provides that the parent has the obligation to establish that a unilateral placement is appropriate, which in this case is the special education that the parent obtained from {UnilateralSchoolName} (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]).

[13] The district did not cross examine the witness (see Tr. pp. 12-13).

[14] Generally, an adjudicative fact may be judicially noticed when that fact "is not subject to reasonable dispute because it" is either "generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction" or "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[a], [b][1]-[b][2]).  While a court is empowered with the discretion to "take judicial notice on its own," a court "must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[c][1]-[2]).  In addition, while a court "may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding," a party—upon request—must be provided with the opportunity to be heard "on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[d]-[e]).  However, if a court "takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[e]).

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[1] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with an other health-impairment is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][9]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][10]).

[2] Little Apple has not been approved by the Commissioner of Education as an agency or school with which districts may contract to instruct students with disabilities (see 8 NYCRR 200.1[d], 200.7).

[3] The due process complaint notice indicated that the student was parentally placed at a private school for the 2022-23 school year (Parent Ex. A at p. 1).

[4] A corrected decision was issued on October 11, 2024 amending the case number in the header at pages 2-9 and including the signature of the IHO (see Oct. 11, 2024 IHO Decision at pp. 2-9).  The September 12, 2024 decision is otherwise unaltered (compare Sept. 12, 2024 IHO Decision, with Oct. 11, 2024 IHO Decision).  For appeal purposes, the parent was required to timely serve a request for review upon the district as calculated from the IHO's September 12, 2024 final decision and did so in this instance.

[5] State law provides that "services" includes "education for students with disabilities," which means "special educational programs designed to serve persons who meet the definition of children with disabilities set forth in [Education Law § 4401(1)]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[1][a], [d]).

[6] State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007–Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c," Attachment 1 (Questions and Answers), VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available at https://www.nysed.gov/special-education/guidance-parentally-placed-nonpublic-elementary-and-secondary-school-students).  The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.).  The guidance has recently been reorganized on the State's web site and the paginated pdf versions of the documents previously available do not currently appear there, having been updated with web based versions.

[7] This provision is separate and distinct from the State's adoption of statutory language effectuating the federal requirement that the district of location "expend a proportionate amount of its federal funds made available under part B of the individuals with disabilities education act for the provision of services to students with disabilities attending such nonpublic schools" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2-a]).

[8] The district did not seek judicial review of these decisions.

[9] A statutory or regulatory amendment is generally presumed to have prospective application unless there is clear language indicating retroactive intent (see Ratha v. Rubicon Res., LLC, 111 F.4th 946, 963-69 [9th Cir. 2024]).  The presence of a future effective date typically suggests that the amendment is intended to apply prospectively, not retroactively (see People v. Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 203 [2022]).  The due process complaint notice in the present matter is dated July 1, 2024, prior to the July 16, 2024 effective date of the emergency regulation (see Parent Ex. A), which regulation has since lapsed.

[10] On November 1, 2024, Supreme Court issued a second order clarifying that the temporary restraining order applied to both emergency actions and activities involving permanent adoption of the rule until the petition was decided.

[11] Neither the guidance nor the district indicated if this jurisdictional viewpoint was conveyed publicly or only privately to the district, when it was communicated, or to whom.  There was no public expression of these points that the undersigned was aware of until policymakers began rulemaking activities in May 2024; however, as the number of allegations began to mount that the district's CSEs had not been convening and services were not being delivered, at that point the district began to respond by making unsuccessful jurisdictional arguments to SRO's in the past, which decisions were subject to judicial review but went unchallenged (see e.g.Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121).  The guidance document is no longer available on the State's website; thus a copy of the August 2024 rate dispute guidance has been added to the administrative hearing record.

[12] State law provides that the parent has the obligation to establish that a unilateral placement is appropriate, which in this case is the special education that the parent obtained from {UnilateralSchoolName} (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]).

[13] The district did not cross examine the witness (see Tr. pp. 12-13).

[14] Generally, an adjudicative fact may be judicially noticed when that fact "is not subject to reasonable dispute because it" is either "generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction" or "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[a], [b][1]-[b][2]).  While a court is empowered with the discretion to "take judicial notice on its own," a court "must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[c][1]-[2]).  In addition, while a court "may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding," a party—upon request—must be provided with the opportunity to be heard "on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[d]-[e]).  However, if a court "takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard" (Fed. R. Evid. 201[e]).