I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the district) appeals from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) to the extent it ordered certain relief to remedy the district's failure to offer an appropriate educational program to respondents' (the parents') daughter for the 2024-25 school year.  The appeal must be dismissed.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

Given the limited issues on appeal, a detailed recitation of the student's educational history is not necessary.  In addition, the student was the subject of prior impartial hearings, as well as a State-level appeal, and the parties' familiarity with those prior matters is presumed (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-307).  Briefly, the student is nonverbal and has global developmental delays (Parent Ex. E at p. 1).[1]  The student never attended a school-based program and, instead, received a variety of special education services in the home for several years, beginning in the 2013-14 school year (see Parent Exs. E at p. 1; II ¶ 16).

A CSE convened on May 9, 2023, when the student was 13 years old, found the student continued to be eligible for special education services as a student with multiple disabilities, and developed an IEP with a projected implementation date of May 10, 2023 and a projected date of annual review of May 9, 2024 (see Parent Ex. G).[2]  The May 2023 CSE recommended 12-month programming consisting of five two-hour sessions per week of individual special class home instruction with four 45-minute sessions per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), four 45-minute sessions per week of individual physical therapy (PT), and six 60-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy, all of which were to be delivered in the student's home (id. at pp. 21-22).  The CSE recommended assistive technology in the form of an all-static-display speech generating device (id. at p. 22).  The student's placement recommendation was identified on the IEP as home/hospital instruction (id. at p. 26).  The May 2023 IEP was the subject of the prior impartial hearing and State-level review (see Application of a Student a Disability, Appeal No. 24-307).

In a letter dated June 17, 2024, the parents stated their position that the district had denied the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to convene the CSE to develop an IEP for the student for the 2024-25 school year (Parent Ex. B at p. 1).  The parents further provided the district with notice of their intent to maintain the delivery of private services to the student for the 2024-25 school year pursuant to pendency and to seek funding and/or reimbursement from the district for the costs of any services that they obtained and funded at their own expense (id. at pp. 1-2).  The parents indicated that the student's pendency program arose from an unappealed IHO decision and consisted of a "home program and services" including 25 hours per week of special education itinerant teacher (SEIT) services/services from a special education teacher; six 60-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy/feeding services; four 45-minute sessions per week of OT; four 45-minute sessions per week of PT; one 90-minute team meeting per month; and assistive technology (id. at p. 2).

In a second letter to the district dated June 17, 2024, the parents reiterated their position and intent and also asked that the district ensure that it provides forms to the parents and/or providers to process district funding of the student's services "in a timely manner" to avoid any "gap in services" (Parent Ex. C at pp. 1-2).  The parents also asked that the district assist them in ensuring providers were in place to deliver the student's services (id. at p. 2).  Attached to their letter, the parents provided a copy of an April 2024 IHO decision pertaining to the 2022-23 school year, which the parents claimed was the basis for the student's pendency placement (id. at pp. 3-24).

A. Due Process Complaint Notice

In a due process complaint notice dated July 1, 2024, the parents alleged that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year (Parent Ex. A).  Specifically, the parents alleged that the district failed to convene a CSE to develop an IEP for the student for the 2024-25 school year (id. at p. 5).  Moreover, the parents claimed that the district failed to conduct a triennial evaluation of the student and failed to comply with prior orders of IHOs directing the district to fund neuropsychological and assistive technology evaluations, as well as an evaluation to assess the student's need for instruction using applied behavior analysis (ABA), and to "[r]econvene to assess the Student 'in all areas of suspected disability' to determine the Student's educational needs" (id. at p. 6).  The parents also asserted that the district did not provide the parents a prior written notice or school location letter for the 2024-25 school year (id.).  Finally, the parents alleged that the district continued to improperly address notices regarding the student to an individual who was not a parent of the student (id.).

The parents invoked pendency based on the unappealed April 2024 IHO decision (Parent Ex. A at pp. 3, 8-9).  For relief, the parents requested that the district fund the student's home-based program for the 12-month 2024-25 school year consisting of 15 hours per week of home instruction, 25 hours per week of special education teacher services, six 60-minute sessions per week of individual speech and feeding therapy, four 45-minute sessions per week of OT, four 45-minute sessions per week of PT, and one 90-minute team meeting per month (id. at p. 9).  The parents also sought an order that the district issue a waiver for the student to receive services after school, modify the student's records to correct the parent's name, fund "any and all evaluations," and provide compensatory education (id. at pp. 9-10).

B. Events Post-Dating the Due Process Complaint Notice

The parents obtained a private neuropsychological evaluation of the student, which was memorialized in a report dated July 23, 2024 (see Parent Ex. E).

A CSE convened on July 26, 2024, found that the student continued to be eligible for special education as a student with multiple disabilities, and developed an IEP with a projected implementation date of September 5, 2024 (see Dist. Ex. 1).  The CSE recommended the same programming as the March 2023 IEP with the exception of the duration of speech-language therapy services, for which the CSE recommended a reduction to 30-minute sessions (compare Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 16-17, 20, with Parent Ex. G at pp. 21-22, 26).

In a letter dated August 14, 2024, the parents rejected the July 2024 IEP (see Parent Ex. F).  The parents asserted that the IEP did not accurately reflect what was discussed at the meeting, and they requested that the CSE reconvene or amend the IEP (id. at p. 1).  The parents contended that the CSE agreed the student was entitled to fifteen hours per week of home instruction, for three hours per day, but the IEP only provided for ten hours per week (id.).  The parents also asserted that the reduction in the duration of speech-language therapy to 30-minute sessions was not consistent with the discussion had at the meeting (id.).  The parents summarized additional concerns that they had expressed during the CSE meeting that were not memorialized in the IEP, including their request that the student's program include an additional 25 hours per week of SEIT services or special education teacher support services (SETSS) and one 90-minute team meeting per month (id. at p. 2).  By their letter, the parents also requested an assistive technology evaluation and reiterated prior requests that the district correct the mother's name in its system (id.).

In October 2024, the district approved providers to deliver OT and PT to the student pursuant to related service authorizations (RSAs) (Parent Ex. S).  Private providers delivered the student's speech-language therapy and special education teacher services (see Parent Exs. Y-Z; AA; CC).

C. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision

The matter was assigned to an IHO from the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH).  On July 11, 2024, the IHO sent an email to the parties that included an attachment titled "Individual Rules of Practice" (IHO Ex. I).  On July 30, 2024, the IHO issued an interim order, finding that the student's pendency placement was based on an IEP dated March 18, 2022 and the unappealed April 2024 IHO decision (Interim IHO Decision).  After a prehearing conference on August 2, 2024 (see Aug. 2, 2024 Tr. pp. 1-25), an impartial hearing convened on November 6, 2024, and concluded on January 13, 2025, after four days of proceedings (see Tr. pp. 1-280).

In a decision dated March 14, 2025, the IHO found that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year (IHO Decision at pp. 2, 6-10).[3]  In regard to the district's denial of a FAPE, the IHO held that the district failed to conduct a triennial evaluation and failed to ensure that an IEP was in place at the start of the 12-month 2024-25 school year (id. at pp. 6-7).  The IHO also found that the recommendations of the July 2024 CSE were "grossly inappropriate" as the CSE reduced the student's speech-language therapy without explanation, recommended an inadequate level of home instruction, and failed to recommend SETSS or monthly team meetings for the providers to coordinate (id. at pp. 7-9).  Additionally, the IHO discussed the inaccurate communications from the district, finding that notices and communications were sent to the attention of a person other than the parent (id. at p. 9).  The IHO noted that the district did not provide a justification for doing this and held that it was "inexplicable that the [district] ha[d] not resolved this issue" (id.).  Relatedly, the IHO found that, although the district offered into evidence a prior written notice dated in August 2024, this was after the school year began and, in any event, the notice was addressed to a person other than the parent, and listed a different mailing address than the address on the due process complaint (id.).

Next, the IHO turned to relief for the denial of FAPE (IHO Decision at pp. 10-17).  The IHO ordered the district to amend the student's IEP for the 2024-25 school to provide for the student to receive 12-month programming consisting of services delivered in the student's home, including 15 hours per week of home instruction, 25 hours per week of SETSS, six 60-minute sessions per week of speech-language therapy/feeding therapy, four 45-minute sessions per week of OT, four 45-minute sessions per week of PT, and one 90-minute meeting per month for team providers, and provision of assistive technology (id. at pp. 10, 15).  The IHO ordered that the district continue providing these services through the current providers at their respective rates for the 2024-25 school year (id. at pp. 11, 15-16).  To the extent necessary, the IHO ordered the district obtain any waiver required in order to ensure the student's receipt of services after school hours (id. at pp. 11, 16).  Next, the IHO ordered the district to conduct an evaluation of the student in all areas of suspected disability and, further, to reimburse the parent for the costs of the private neuropsychological evaluation (id.).  The IHO also ordered the district to correct all records related to the 2024-25 school year to include the parent's correct name and address and to fix the issue in its system that was causing this problem (id.).  Regarding the parents' request for compensatory education, the IHO held that, because the district failed to provide authorizations for OT and PT in a timely manner, the student was entitled to all missed sessions as compensatory services, less any services obtained already under pendency (id. at p. 12, 16).

Next, the IHO found that the hearing record established that the district's CSE "misunderstood the law's requirements and, as a result, committed multiple procedural and substantive violations of the Student's rights" (IHO Decision at p. 12).  Given these misunderstandings, the IHO determined that staff training was appropriate and cited to specific case law to support such an order (id. at pp. 12-13).  Accordingly, the IHO ordered the district to fund five hours of training on specified topics for district staff who participated in the July 2024 CSE meeting (id. at pp. 16-17).

The IHO also made certain provisions for the implementation of his order (IHO Decision at pp. 13-15).  In particular, the IHO ordered the district to provide the parent with "contact information" for an individual from the "Impartial Hearing Order Implementation Unit" and that such individual shall "respond to any inquiry by the Parent[s] (or their attorney) concerning the implementation of [the IHO's] Order within 2 business days" (id. at pp. 13, 15).  The IHO noted that he provided the parties with notice that he might include such an order with any relief awarded and that the district did not respond or make any argument on the topic at the impartial hearing (id. at p. 13).  Further, the IHO found that his order in this regard complemented the stipulations arising from the class action lawsuit in L.V. v. New York City Department of Education, No-03-Civ-9917 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2007), which involves the district's implementation of IHOs' orders (id. at p. 14).  The IHO noted that he was making no findings with respect to the district's systemic policies and practices regarding implementation (id.).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

The district appeals, arguing that the IHO erred in ordering staff training and provision to the parent of contact information of an individual from the implementation unit with whom they can communicate regarding implementation of the IHO's order.[4]  The district contends that the IHO exceeded his authority in ordering relief in these forms.  The district argues that the IHO did not provide notice that he would order relief in excess of what was requested in the due process complaint.  In addition, the district argues that the award of staff training does not relate to the district's denial of FAPE and is overly broad given that only one staff member testified at the impartial hearing.  Further, the district claims that the IHO's order for training "could be far reaching" given its wording.  The district also contends that the order for staff training is disciplinary in nature as it imposes financial penalties/sanctions on the district and is "akin to monetary damages."  Next, the district argues that the order for provision of a contact person with whom the parents can communicate regarding implementation of the IHO's order represented the IHO's attempt to retain jurisdiction over the case by ordering the district to implement the decision in a specific manner.  The district's claims that the warning in the IHO's prehearing rules was not sufficient to put the district on notice that the IHO intended to consider relief in this form.

In an answer, the parents respond to the district's arguments and assert that the IHO's decision should be affirmed in its entirety.

V. Applicable Standards

Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).  The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.  After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 [2017]).  While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]).  Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).

The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]).  A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203).  However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).  "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404).  The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).  Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).  Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]).  The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).  The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).[5]

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252).  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).

VI. Discussion

The district does not appeal the IHO's finding that it failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year or the majority of the relief awarded by the IHO.  Accordingly, the IHO's findings and orders that have not been appealed have become final and binding on the parties and will not be reviewed (34 CFR 300.514[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]; see M.Z. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1314992, at *6-*7, *10 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013]).  The only issue on appeal is whether the IHO exceeded his authority by ordering the district to fund training of its staff who attended the July 2024 CSE and to provide a contact person with whom the parents can communicate regarding the implementation of the IHO's order.

An IHO generally has broad authority to fashion appropriate equitable relief (see, e.g., Mr. and Mrs. A v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 422-23, 427-30 [S.D.N.Y. 2011]; see Forest Grove v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 [2009]); however, an IHO may not use this authority to order relief to remedy an issue that was not raised.  Generally, the party requesting an impartial hearing has the first opportunity to identify the range of issues to be addressed at the hearing (Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-141; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 08-056).  Under the IDEA and its implementing regulations, a party requesting an impartial hearing may not raise issues at the impartial hearing that were not raised in its original due process complaint notice unless the other party agrees (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][B]; 34 CFR 300.508[d][3][i], 300.511[d]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[i][7][i][a]; [j][1][ii]), or the original due process complaint is amended prior to the impartial hearing per permission given by the IHO at least five days prior to the impartial hearing (20 U.S.C. § 1415[c][2][E][i][II]; 34 CFR 300.507[d][3][ii]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[i][7][b]).  However, with respect to relief (versus alleged violations), the due process complaint notice must state a "proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available to the party at the time" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415 [b][7][A][ii]; 34 CFR 300.508[b]).  It is essential that an IHO disclose his or her intention to reach an issue or consider relief which the parties have not raised as a matter of basic fairness and due process of law (Application of a Child with a Handicapping Condition, Appeal No. 91-40; see John M. v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.3d 708 [7th Cir. 2007]).

Initially, the district is correct that the parent's due process complaint notice did not request relief in the form of staff training or seek an award relating to communication with the implementation unit (see Parent Ex. A).  However, contrary to the district's position on appeal, the IHO did provide the parties with notice that he might consider ordering this type of relief in the IHO's Individual Rules of Practice, which the IHO sent to the parties via email on July 11, 2024 (see IHO Ex. I).  The Individual Rules of Practice included a sub-heading for "Remedies/Relief" which stated that the IHO:

may order other/additional relief that you have not requested.  This may include ordering the [district] to comply with IDEA procedures and/or undergo training related to any violations I find in the case.  When issuing orders, I may require the [district] to provide to the Parent the contact information for the [district] staff person responsible for implementing the order.  I may also require the [district] to respond to any questions from the Parent (or their attorney) regarding implementation within a certain time period.  If you want to oppose any such relief, you must let me know before or during our scheduled hearing date

(id. at pp. 7-8).  The IHO correctly notes that the district did not respond to or make arguments opposing such orders during the impartial hearing (IHO Decision at p. 13).  Moreover, the IHO included in his interim order on pendency a directive that the district provide the parents with a contact person with whom to communicate regarding the provision of the student's pendency program (Interim IHO Decision at p. 2), thus putting the district on further notice that the IHO was inclined to include such language in his orders in this matter.  Accordingly, I do not find that the IHO erred in awarding the specific relief at issue on the ground that the district did not have notice of the IHO's intent to consider such relief.

The district argues that the IHO lacked authority to award relief in these forms as they were not connected to the district's denial of a FAPE.  However, the IHO explained in detail how the orders were tied to the particular denials of a FAPE involving this student (see IHO Decision at pp. 12-15).  Because of the connections so made, this matter is distinguishable from other instances where IHOs' orders of training and/or particulars of implementation were not connected to the facts presented (see, e.g., Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-151 [finding that the only support to justify the relief awarded was presented in the representative's combined opening and closing statement, which was not a substitute for evidence]; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 23-155 [finding no facts or circumstances indicating issues related to the district's implementation of orders or lack of training of district employees]).  In those other matters, the awards at issue appeared more targeted to address matters outside the IHO's authority, namely perceived systemic problems with training of staff or implementation of IHO orders in the district, which, generally, are "to be addressed by the federal courts," as opposed to "technical questions of how to define and treat individual students' learning disabilities, which are best addressed by administrators" (Levine v. Greece Cent. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 261470, at *9 [W.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2009] aff'd, 353 Fed. App'x 461 [2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2009]; see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 11-091).  Neither the IHO, nor I for that matter, have plenary authority to pass judgment on the district implementation policies and processes that affect all students.

In contrast, here, the awards at issue are tailored to address this particular student's circumstances and based on the evidence presented during the impartial hearing.  In particular, the allegations made by the parents in the due process complaint notice related to, among other things, the timing of the student's annual review, the district's failure to evaluate the student, the district's failure to implement prior IHO orders, and the district's failure to provide the parents with required notices (see Parent Ex. A).  After the parents filed the due process complaint notice, the CSE convened and developed the July 2024 IEP (see Dist. Ex. 1), which the district initially defended at the impartial hearing.[6]  The district has not appealed the IHO's findings that the July 2024 IEP was deficient as the CSE reduced the student's speech-language therapy without explanation, recommended an inadequate level of home instruction, and failed to recommend SETSS or monthly team meetings (IHO Decision at pp. 7-9).

Related to these allegations and unappealed FAPE violations, the IHO cited evidence reflecting the district's:

misunderstandings about when the 12-month school year begins and ends, when a student's IEP expires, when a new IEP must be in effect, what services must be on an IEP (rather than in side documents), whether a student is entitled to after school services . . ., when a student must be reevaluated, who can make decisions as part of an IEP team (and, specifically, that people who are not members of the team do not have the authority to make decisions), and what it means to make individualized determinations based on a student's unique needs

(IHO Decision at p. 12).  For example, the IHO cited the mother's testimony that the July 2024 CSE did not recommend SETSS on the student's IEP because the school psychologist indicated—after having a conversation outside of the CSE meeting with an "impartial hearing liaison"—that she did not know how to put such services on the IEP but that she would look into the student receiving the services via RSAs (id. at p. 4, citing Parent Ex. II ¶ 54).  The IHO also noted the school psychologist's testimony that she agreed the student needed 15 hours per week of SETSS but that SETSS "is a related service that does not go on an IEP and is given to the Parent through an RSA or P4" (IHO Decision at pp. 7, 8, citing Tr. pp. 130, 146-47).  Regarding the parent's request for 25 hours of SETSS, the IHO noted the school psychologist's testimony that the district "does not provide after school services" (IHO Decision at p. 7, citing Tr. p. 137).  The district makes no argument on appeal that, in fact, the district school psychologist did not reflect a misunderstanding of the district's obligations.

Given the district's specific failures to provide a FAPE to this student and the evidence in the hearing record, I do not find that the IHO erred in ordering staff training.  Contrary to the district's contention on appeal, the IHO's order was confined to specific individuals who attended the July 2024 CSE meeting, to a maximum time and cost, and to specific topics related to the misunderstandings identified by the IHO based on the evidence in the hearing record with some discretion to the trainer to address "related statutory provisions, regulatory provisions, case law, or information" (IHO Decision at p. 17).[7]  Moreover, given that this student has been the subject of multiple impartial hearings, the IHO did not abuse his discretion in crafting relief to attempt to avoid a future denial of a FAPE to the student.

Finally, the district argues that the IHO's directive relating to the provision to the parents of contact information for an individual with whom to communicate regarding implementation of the order tends to intrude on the district's discretion to follow an administrative process to comply with the order (cf. Abrams v. Carranza, 2020 WL 6048785, at *2 [S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020] [discussing the district's "reasonable documentation requirements" prior to funding pendency and declining to order injunctive relief "mandating immediate payment"], aff'd sub nom., Abrams v. Porter, 2021 WL 5829762 [2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2021]).  The IHO specifically discussed this concern, distinguished the Abrams case, and also acknowledged a class action lawsuit relating to the district's failure to implement final IHO orders, in which the district and the class members entered into a stipulation to target the district's timely implementation of orders and the court appointed a special master to bring the district into compliance with its obligations under the stipulation (see LV v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2021 WL 663718, at *3 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021]; see also Order with Respect to Motion for Appointment of a Special Master, L.V. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 03-cv-09917 [S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 12, 2003]).  The IHO found that his order would complement the stipulation arising from L.V. (IHO Decision at p. 14).

The IHO weighed the concerns that the district cites on appeal but found that the hearing record, nevertheless, supported the order requiring a contact person be assigned with whom the parent could communicate regarding implementation of the IHO's award (IHO Decision at pp. 14-15 & n.2).  The district does not specifically grapple with the IHO's discussion of these considerations and, instead, just reiterates the points that the IHO already weighed and rejected.  In this instance, I find insufficient basis to disturb the IHO's order given evidence in the hearing record regarding the parent's frustrations communicating with the district regarding the implementation of prior IHO orders or of the student's mandated services.  For example, the mother testified that, despite "multiple prior IHO orders that [the student] be evaluated," the district had not reevaluated her (Parent Ex. II ¶ 29).  In the parents' June 2024 letters to the district, they noted that "[i]n the past," they encountered difficulty identifying providers to deliver services to the student "despite requests for assistance from the Parents" and their attorney and that the district had failed to timely provide RSAs or timely pay providers (Parent Exs. B at p. 2; C at pp. 1-2).  In the parents' August 2024 letter to the district, the parents again asked the district to correct the name and address to which the district sent communications about the student as the district continued to send notices to an individual who was not the student's parent despite prior IHO order(s) directing it to correct the issue (Parent Ex. F at pp. 2, 11).[8]  Moreover, the IHO found that the district did not fully implement the student's pendency services pursuant to the IHO's interim order in this matter and ordered compensatory education (see IHO Decision at p. 12).

As the IHO acknowledged, neither IHOs nor SROs have authority to enforce prior decisions rendered by administrative hearing officers (see IHO Decision at p. 6; Educ. Law §§ 4404[1][a]; [2]; see, e.g., A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 76, 78 n.13 [noting that IHOs do not retain jurisdiction to enforce their orders and that a party who receives a favorable administrative determination may enforce it in court]; A.T. v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 1998 WL 765371, at *7, *9-*10 & n.16 [E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998] [noting that SROs have no independent "administrative enforcement" power and granting an injunction requiring the district to implement a final SRO decision]).; however, given the evidence presented, the parents may very well be inclined to pursue enforcement through either the State complaint process or by seeking enforcement of IHO decision(s) through the judicial system (see 34 CFR 300.152[c][3]; SJB v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2004 WL 1586500, at *4-*5 [S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004] [finding that parties need not initiate additional administrative proceedings to enforce prior administrative orders]; see also A.R., 407 F.3d at 78 n.13).  While the IHO could not enforce the prior orders, under the circumstances presented, it was not an abuse of the IHO's discretion to attempt to craft an order to encourage the district to communicate with the parent with respect to the relief awarded in this matter.

VII. Conclusion

There being insufficient ground presented to modify the IHO's orders for the district to fund specific staff training and provide the parents with contact information of an individual with whom the parents may communicate regarding implementation of the IHO's order, the inquiry is at an end.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.