25-271
Application of a STUDENT WITH A DISABILITY, by her parents, for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services by the New York City Department of Education
Shehebar Law, PC, attorneys for petitioners, by Y. Allen Shehebar, Esq.
Liz Vladeck, General Counsel, attorneys for respondent, by Sarah M. Pourhosseini, Esq.
Decision
I. Introduction
This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law. Petitioner (the parent) appeals the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which dismissed her due process complaint notice without prejudice for failure to prosecute and did not make a determination regarding pendency. The appeal must be dismissed.
II. Overview—Administrative Procedures
When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c). The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programming for students with disabilities under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]). If disputes occur between parents and school districts, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]). Incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).
New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]). First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]). An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]). The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]). The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).
A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]). The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5). The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]). The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).
III. Facts and Procedural History
The parties' familiarity with this matter is presumed and therefore the facts and procedural history of this case and the IHO's decision will not be recited in detail. Briefly, the parent filed a due process complaint notice on October 16, 2024, alleging that the district failed to implement the student's IESP by failing to locate a provider to deliver the student's special education teacher support services (SETSS) and related services, resulting in the district failing to offer the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2024-25 school year (see Due Process Compl. Not.). An impartial hearing convened before an impartial hearing officer (IHO) with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on April 1, 2025 at 11:18 A.M. and neither the parent nor her counsel appeared (Tr. p. 3). The district requested that the matter be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the IHO granted the application (id.).
In an order of dismissal dated April 1, 2025, the IHO dismissed the parent's due process complaint notice for failure to prosecute (see IHO Decision). The IHO stated that the parent failed to appear through her counsel at the impartial hearing, which was held remotely, but that parent's attorneys "sent multiple emails" indicating that they were in the hearing room, and nobody was there (id. at p. 1). The IHO noted that the parent's attorneys were not in the hearing room or the waiting room (id.). The IHO granted the district's motion to dismiss the parent's due process complaint notice for lack of prosecution and dismissed the parent's due process complaint notice without prejudice (id. at pp. 1-2).
IV. Appeal for State-Level Review
The parent appeals, alleging that the IHO erred in dismissing the parent's due process complaint notice because the parent's attorneys were attempting to join the impartial hearing. The parent alleges that the IHO failed to provide a fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments, failed to ensure access to the hearing and accommodation of logistical barriers, and failed to protect the student's automatic pendency rights. The parent notes that the underlying due process complaint notice was refiled following the IHO's dismissal without prejudice and the parent does not seek reversal of the IHO's dismissal or remand of the matter. However, the parent seeks relief on appeal due to the IHO's failure to rule on pendency. The parent requests that the IHO's failure to issue a pendency order be reversed and that an order on pendency be issued providing that the student's pendency placement consists of three periods per week of SETSS and a full-time, individual health paraprofessional as mandated by the student's February 16, 2024 IESP. The parent requests the order on pendency be retroactive to the initial filing of the original due process complaint notice, October 16, 2024.
In an answer, the district argues that the IHO correctly dismissed the parent's due process complaint notice without prejudice. Regarding the parent's allegations pertaining to pendency, the district asserts that the parent did not request a pendency hearing pursuant to the IHO's rules and, in any event, is not entitled to district funding of private services as the student's pendency placement.[1]
V. Applicable Standards
The IDEA and the New York State Education Law require that a student remain in his or her then current educational placement, unless the student's parents and the board of education otherwise agree, during the pendency of any proceedings relating to the identification, evaluation or placement of the student (20 U.S.C. § 1415[j]; Educ. Law §§ 4404[4]; 34 CFR 300.518[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[m]; see Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 531 [2d Cir. 2020]; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 170-71 [2d Cir. 2014]; Mackey v. Bd. of Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 163 [2d Cir. 2004], citing Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 [2d Cir. 1982]; M.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 982 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246-47 [S.D.N.Y. 2013]; Student X v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *20 [E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008]; Bd. of Educ. of Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist. v. O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455-56 [S.D.N.Y. 2005]).[2] Pendency has the effect of an automatic injunction, and the party requesting it need not meet the requirements for injunctive relief such as irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of the hardships (Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906; see Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 335 F.3d 297, 301 [4th Cir. 2003]; Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 [3d Cir. 1996]). The purpose of the pendency provision is to provide stability and consistency in the education of a student with a disability and "strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students . . . from school" (Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 [1987] [emphasis in original]; Evans v. Bd. of Educ. of Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 [S.D.N.Y. 1996], citing Bd. of Educ. of City of New York v. Ambach, 612 F. Supp. 230, 233 [E.D.N.Y. 1985]). A student's placement pursuant to the pendency provision of the IDEA is evaluated independently from the appropriateness of the program offered the student by the CSE (Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160-61; Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906; O'Shea, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 459 [noting that "pendency placement and appropriate placement are separate and distinct concepts"]). The pendency provision does not require that a student remain in a particular site or location (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532; T.M., 752 F.3d at 170-71; Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Educ. at Malcolm X Pub. Sch. 79 v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 753, 756 [2d Cir. 1980]; see Child's Status During Proceedings, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,709 [Aug. 14, 2006] [noting that the "current placement is generally not considered to be location-specific"]), or at a particular grade level (Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 03-032; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 95-16).
Under the IDEA, the pendency inquiry focuses on identifying the student's then-current educational placement (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532; Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163, citing Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906). Although not defined by statute, the phrase "then current placement" has been found to mean either: (1) the placement described in the student's most recently implemented IEP; (2) the operative placement actually functioning at the time when the due process proceeding was commenced; or (3) the placement at the time of the previously implemented IEP (Dervishi v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 653 Fed. App'x 55, 57-58 [2d Cir. June 27, 2016], quoting Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163; T.M., 752 F.3d at 170-71 [holding that the pendency provision "requires a school district to continue funding whatever educational placement was last agreed upon for the child"]; see Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 452 [2d Cir. 2015] [holding that a student's entitlement to stay-put arises when a due process complaint notice is filed]; Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee, 96 F.3d 78, 83 [3d Cir. 1996]; Letter to Baugh, 211 IDELR 481 [OSEP 1987]). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has stated that educational placement means "the general type of educational program in which the child is placed" (Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 753, 756), and that "the pendency provision does not guarantee a disabled child the right to remain in the exact same school with the exact same service providers" (T.M., 752 F.3d at 171). However, if there is an agreement between the parties on the student's educational placement during the due process proceedings, it need not be reduced to a new IEP, and the agreement can supersede the prior unchallenged IEP as the student's then-current educational placement (see Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 483-84 [2d Cir. 2002]; Evans, 921 F. Supp. at 1189 n.3; Murphy v. Arlington Central School District Board of Education, 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 366 [S.D.N.Y. 2000], aff'd, 297 F.3d 195 [2d Cir. 2002]; see also Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197 [OSEP 2007]). Moreover, a prior unappealed IHO decision may establish a student's current educational placement for purposes of pendency (Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23; Letter to Hampden, 49 IDELR 197).
VI. Discussion
According to the parent, after the IHO's dismissal of this matter without prejudice, the parent refiled her due process complaint notice but also filed this appeal to address the IHO's failure to rule on pendency (Req for Rev. ¶ 8). The parent does not request that this matter be remanded or that the IHO's dismissal of the parent's due process complaint notice be disturbed. Instead, the parent only seeks a ruling on the student's pendency placement. However, the hearing record is entirely undeveloped on the issue of pendency.[3] The hearing record does not contain the student's February 14, 2024 IESP that the parent claims pendency should be based upon. Nor is it clear whether the parent is seeking public funding of private services as pendency, as opposed to delivery of the services by the district.[4]
Due to the lack of development of the hearing record regarding the student's pendency placement, I decline to make a finding regarding the parent's pendency claims. To the extent an impartial hearing pertaining to the 2024-25 school year remains pending, the parent may present her request for pendency to the IHO presiding over the newly-filed due process complaint notice.
VII. Conclusion
Having determined that the hearing record is not developed regarding the parent's request for pendency, I decline to make a ruling regarding pendency.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
[1] The district also argues that the parent's pleadings should be rejected for failing to comply with the practice regulations. I have reviewed the pleadings, and I decline to reject the parent's request for review on the grounds stated by the district.
[2] In Ventura de Paulino, the Court concluded that parents may not transfer a student from one nonpublic school to another nonpublic school and simultaneously transfer a district's obligation to fund that pendency placement based upon a substantial similarity analysis (see Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532-36).
[3] Aside from the dismissal of the matter, the lack of development of the hearing record on the issue of pendency also appears to be attributable to the parent. That is, as the district notes, in an email to the parent and her counsel, dated March 21, 2025, the IHO stated that if the parent wished to have a pendency hearing, her attorney was to "notify [the IHO] and the [d]istrict as soon as possible and [the IHO] w[ould] schedule a pendency hearing on a date prior to the merits meeting" (IHO Ex. II at p. 1). The hearing record does not contain any evidence that the parent requested a pendency hearing after receiving this email (see Tr. pp. 1-5; IHO Exs. I-V). On the other hand, if there was an agreement as to the student's pendency placement, a hearing would not be necessary. Aside from its legal argument, the district's position on pendency is unclear.
[4] To the extent a parent points to an unimplemented IESP as pendency but, in fact, seeks public funding of unilaterally obtained private services, the Second Circuit has explained that a parent may not unilaterally move a student to a preferred nonpublic school and still receive pendency funding, since it is the district that is authorized to decide how (and where) a student's pendency services are to be provided as per the text and structure of the IDEA and given that the district is the party responsible for funding the pendency services (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532-35). As noted, however, the hearing record is not sufficiently developed on the question so I will not further opine as to whether this is the case in the present matter.
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[1] The district also argues that the parent's pleadings should be rejected for failing to comply with the practice regulations. I have reviewed the pleadings, and I decline to reject the parent's request for review on the grounds stated by the district.
[2] In Ventura de Paulino, the Court concluded that parents may not transfer a student from one nonpublic school to another nonpublic school and simultaneously transfer a district's obligation to fund that pendency placement based upon a substantial similarity analysis (see Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532-36).
[3] Aside from the dismissal of the matter, the lack of development of the hearing record on the issue of pendency also appears to be attributable to the parent. That is, as the district notes, in an email to the parent and her counsel, dated March 21, 2025, the IHO stated that if the parent wished to have a pendency hearing, her attorney was to "notify [the IHO] and the [d]istrict as soon as possible and [the IHO] w[ould] schedule a pendency hearing on a date prior to the merits meeting" (IHO Ex. II at p. 1). The hearing record does not contain any evidence that the parent requested a pendency hearing after receiving this email (see Tr. pp. 1-5; IHO Exs. I-V). On the other hand, if there was an agreement as to the student's pendency placement, a hearing would not be necessary. Aside from its legal argument, the district's position on pendency is unclear.
[4] To the extent a parent points to an unimplemented IESP as pendency but, in fact, seeks public funding of unilaterally obtained private services, the Second Circuit has explained that a parent may not unilaterally move a student to a preferred nonpublic school and still receive pendency funding, since it is the district that is authorized to decide how (and where) a student's pendency services are to be provided as per the text and structure of the IDEA and given that the district is the party responsible for funding the pendency services (Ventura de Paulino, 959 F.3d at 532-35). As noted, however, the hearing record is not sufficiently developed on the question so I will not further opine as to whether this is the case in the present matter.

