I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the parent) appeals from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO), which found that respondent (the district) offered appropriate special education programming to her son and denied her requests for a nonpublic school placement and reimbursement for the cost of her son's private services delivered by Stride Behavior Services, Inc. (Stride) for the 2024-25 school year.  The appeal must be dismissed.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

The student has been the subject of a prior State-level administrative review, which related to the 2020-21, 2021-22, and 2022-23 school years and the placement of the student in a nonpublic school, funding for related services, and funding of a physical therapy (PT) evaluation (Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-046).  The parties' familiarity with that matter is presumed, and, therefore, the student's educational history leading up to that matter will not be recited here in detail.

Briefly, during the 2023-24 school year, the student attended sixth grade in a district specialized school and received instruction on a 12-month basis in an 8:1+1 special class placement with related services (Parent Ex. P at p. 1).  Starting in February 2024, the student began receiving "30 hours per week of push-in school-based [applied behavior analysis] ABA" services and "10 hours per week of home-based ABA" services from Stride "due to an impartial hearing decision" (id.).

On April 11, 2024, the undersigned reversed portions of an IHO's December 29, 2023 order that deferred the student's placement in a nonpublic school to the district's Central Based Support Team (CBST) and directed the district to develop a behavioral intervention plan (BIP) (Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-046).  Additionally, the undersigned ordered the district to provide the student with certain home and school-based ABA services, and for a CSE to reconvene within 30 days to recommend an appropriate program and placement for the student and determine whether a BIP was required for the student based on the unappealed directive for the district to complete a functional behavioral assessment (FBA) (id.). 

On May 15, 2024, a CSE convened and determined that the student remained eligible for special education services as a student with autism (Dist. Ex. 1 at p. 1).  The CSE recommended that the student receive instruction in an 8:1+1 special class for math, English language arts, social studies, and sciences, and related services consisting of one 30-minute session per week each of individual and group counseling, two 30-minute sessions per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), one 30-minute session per week of individual speech-language therapy, and two 30-minute sessions per week of group speech-language therapy (id. at pp. 30-31).  The CSE also recommended daily paraprofessional services in a group (".8") for behavioral support and a portable word processor (id. at p. 31).  Additionally, the CSE recommended three 60-minute sessions annually of parent counseling and training (id.).

On June 6, 2024, an IHO issued a decision  in another due process proceeding concerning the 2023-24 school year, which ordered prospective placement of the student in a nonpublic school ABA program (Parent Ex. B at pp. 9-10).

A. Due Process Complaint Notice

On July 2, 2024, the parent initiated a third due process proceeding by filing a due process complaint notice, alleging that the district denied the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2024-25 school year (Parent Ex. A).  In an amended due process complaint notice dated August 12, 2024, the parent alleged that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year by failing to recommend an "appropriate program" and placement, and provide necessary services to the student (Parent Ex. H at p. 14).  Specifically, the parent enumerated 14 "factors" which contributed to a denial of a FAPE, which included procedural and substantive allegations (id. at pp. 14-17).  For relief, the parent requested an order directing the district to reconvene a CSE to develop an appropriate IEP in a "more restrictive placement," conduct an FBA and develop a BIP for the student, and direct funding for an interim ABA program for the 2024-25 school year (id. at p. 18).

B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision

After a prehearing conference on August 7, 2024, an impartial hearing convened before an IHO with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on October 9, 2024 and concluded on October 25, 2024, after two days of hearings (Oct. 8, 2024 Tr. pp. 1-361; Oct. 25, 2024 Tr. pp. 1-42).[1]  In a decision dated December 31, 2024, the IHO found that the district demonstrated through testimony and documentary evidence, that it provided the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year (IHO Decision at p. 21).  The IHO cited to the May 2024 IEP and testimony from the district's school psychologist in her finding that the district's recommended program "offered the student a meaningful opportunity to progress academically" (id. at p. 27).   The IHO held the parent's evidence was neither "sufficient nor persuasive" to refute the district's credible evidence that it provided the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year (id.).  The IHO concluded that there were no "procedural or substantive violations of the IDEA" and denied the parent's request for an order directing the district to reconvene a CSE and place the student in a nonpublic school ABA program (id. at p. 30).  Finally, the IHO ordered the CSE to reconvene once the parent provided all updated evaluations that were not submitted to the CSE during the May 2024 meeting (id.).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

The parent appeals, alleging that the IHO erred in finding that the district provided an appropriate program for the student and that the decision was based on incorrect factual findings.  The parent alleges that the IHO erred in failing to rule on specific allegations in the due process complaint. Moreover, the parent alleges that the IHO failed to consider evaluative information leading up to, during, and after the May 2024 CSE meeting.  The parent alleges that the IHO improperly narrowed the scope of the hearing, implied the incorrect legal standard, and made improper credibility determinations.

In an answer, the district seeks an affirmance of the IHO's decision that the district offered the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year by creating a timely and appropriate IEP.  In the alternative, the district argues that the parent failed to prove that the unilaterally obtained ABA services were appropriate, and that equitable considerations did not favor the parent.

V. Applicable Standards

Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).  The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.  After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 [2017]).  While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]).  Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).

The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]).  A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203).  However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).  "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404).  The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).  Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).  Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]).  The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).  The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).[2]

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252).  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).

VI. Discussion - Mootness

At the outset, I note the procedural history of this case is particularly relevant and went largely unaddressed by the IHO at the impartial hearing.  As noted above, the undersigned reviewed the parent's allegations with regard to this student during the 2020-21, 2021-22, and 2022-23 school years and issued a decision on April 11, 2024 (see generally Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-046).  In that decision, I reversed the IHO's order requiring the district to refer the student to the district's CBST to determine the student's eligibility for a nonpublic school placement, and instead, I ordered the CSE to convene in accordance with the directives in my decision and noted specifically, that it was the CSE's role to design an educational program for the student not the CBST's (id.).

Subsequently, in accordance with my order, the CSE convened on May 15, 2024, and designed an educational program memorialized in the student's May 2024 IEP that included an implementation date of May 17, 2024 which would be in effect for the 2024-25 school year (Dist. Ex. 1 at p. 1).  Meanwhile, an IHO issued a decision on June 6, 2024 concerning a due process complaint notice filed by the parent for the 2023-24 school year (Parent Ex. B at p. 3).  The hearing record indicates that the IHO ordered a prospective placement in a 12-month nonpublic school ABA program (id. at pp. 8-9).  The IHO also ordered that the district offer an interim program including push-in and home-based ABA services as well as board certified behavior analyst (BCBA) supervision until such time that the student could be placed in a nonpublic ABA program (id. at p. 10.).  This final order was not appealed by either party and appears it was never effectuated by the district during the 2024-25 school year (Tr. pp. 10-11).

A dispute between parties must at all stages be "real and live," and not "academic," or it risks becoming moot (Lillbask v. State of Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 84 [2d Cir. 2005]; see Toth v. City of New York Dep't of Educ., 720 Fed. App'x 48, 51 [2d Cir. Jan. 2, 2018]; Chaperon v. Banks, 2025 WL 2207908 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025]; F.O. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254 [S.D.N.Y. 2012]; Patskin v. Bd. of Educ. of Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 583 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 [W.D.N.Y. 2008]; Student X v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2008 WL 4890440, at *12 [E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008]; J.N. v. Depew Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4 [W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008]; see also Coleman v. Daines, 19 N.Y.3d 1087, 1090 [2012]; Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714 [1980]).  In general, cases dealing with issues such as desired changes in IEPs, specific placements, and implementation disputes may become moot at the end of the school year because no meaningful relief can be granted (see, e.g., V.M. v. N. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 102, 119-21 [N.D.N.Y. 2013]; M.S. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 734 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280-81 [E.D.N.Y. 2010]; Patskin, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29; J.N., 2008 WL 4501940, at *3-*4; but see A.A. v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 2017 WL 2591906, at *6-*9 [E.D. Mich. June 15, 2017] [considering the question of the "potential mootness of a claim for declaratory relief"]).  Administrative decisions rendered in cases that concern such issues that arise out of school years since expired may no longer appropriately address the current needs of the student (see Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F.2d 1036, 1040 [5th Cir. 1989]; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 07-139; Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 07-028; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 06-070; Application of a Child with a Disability, Appeal No. 04-007).

However, a claim may not be moot despite the end of a school year for which the student's IEP was written, if the conduct complained of is "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 [1988]; Toth, 720 Fed. App'x at 51; Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 84-85; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1040).  The exception applies only in limited situations (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 [1983]), and is severely circumscribed (Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 [2d Cir. 1998]).  It must be apparent that "the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration" (Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 [1982]; see Knaust, 157 F.3d at 88).  Many IEP disputes escape a finding of mootness due to the short duration of the school year facing the comparatively long litigation process (see Lillbask, 397 F.3d at 85).  Controversies are "capable of repetition" when there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again (Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 [1975]; Toth, 720 Fed. App'x at 51; see Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d at 714-15).  To create a reasonable expectation of recurrence, repetition must be more than theoretically possible (Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482; Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of City of Watervliet, 260 F.3d 114, 120 [2d Cir. 2001]).  Mere speculation that the parties will be involved in a dispute over the same issue does not rise to the level of a reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability of recurrence (Russman, 260 F.3d at 120; but see A.A., 2017 WL 2591906, at *7-*9 [finding that the controversy as to "whether and to what extent the [s]tudent can be mainstreamed" constituted a "recurring controversy [that] will evade review during the effective period of each IEP for the [s]tudent"]; see also Toth, 720 Fed. App'x at 51 [finding that a new IEP that did not include the service requested by the parent established that the parent's concern that the prior IEP would be repeated was not speculative and the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine applied]).

In the instant matter, the May 2024 IEP itself has expired by its own terms and the parties' dispute of the IEP's content would not have any impact on the IHO's June 6, 2024 order granting prospective relief as it encompassed the entirety of the 2024-25 school year (see Parent Ex. B).  The district attempts to argue that it offered the student a FAPE through the May 2024 IEP, but ignores the fact that the unappealed June 6, 2024 order thereafter governed the student's services for the 2024-25 school year.  The parent appears to seek enforcement of the IHO's June 6, 2024 order; however, this must be sought elsewhere as neither IHOs nor SROs have authority to enforce prior decisions rendered by administrative hearing officers (see Educ. Law §§ 4404[1][a]; [2]; see, e.g., A.R. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 76, 78 n.13 [noting that IHOs do not retain jurisdiction to enforce their orders and that a party who receives a favorable administrative determination may enforce it in court]; A.T. v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 1998 WL 765371, at *7, *9-*10 & n.16 [E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998] [noting that SROs have no independent "administrative enforcement" power and granting an injunction requiring the district to implement a final SRO decision]).

As decisions by SROs have repeatedly warned, while prospective placement might be appropriate in rare cases (see Connors v. Mills, 34 F.Supp.2d 795, 799, 804-06 [N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1998] [noting a prospective placement would be appropriate where "both the school and the parent agree[d] that the child's unique needs require[d] placement in a private non-approved school and that there [we]re no approved schools that would be appropriate"]), the pitfalls of awarding a prospective placement have been noted in multiple State-level administrative review decisions, including that where a prospective placement is obtained by the parents through the impartial hearing, such relief could be treated as an election of remedies subject only to further judicial review, where the parents assume the risk that future unforeseen events could cause the relief to be undesirable (see, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 19-018; see also Tobuck v. Banks, 2024 WL 1349693, at *5 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024]).  Thus, in the event prospective relief is awarded, as was the case here, it is not permissible to return to due process to relitigate the prospective relief obtained in a final decision of an administrative hearing officer in a due process proceeding.

VII. Conclusion

In sum, the parent's appeal is moot as the May 2024 IEP has expired by its own terms and the IHO's June 6, 2024 prospective order, which superseded the May 2024 IEP, was not appealed.  Therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.