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25-293

Application of the NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for review of a determination of a hearing officer relating to the provision of educational services to a student with a disability

Appearances: 

Liz Vladeck, General Counsel, attorneys for petitioner, by Grace K. Gerhart, Esq.

Decision

I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioner (the district) appeals the decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which ordered the district to fund a bank of compensatory education for respondents' (the parents') son to remedy the district's failure to provide the student with equitable services for the 2023-24 school year.  The appeal must be sustained.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

When a student who resides in New York is eligible for special education services and attends a nonpublic school, Article 73 of the New York State Education Law allows for the creation of an individualized education services program (IESP) under the State's so-called "dual enrollment" statute (see Educ. Law § 3602-c).  The task of creating an IESP is assigned to the same committee that designs educational programing for students with disabilities under the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482), namely a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414 [d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, State law provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of [Education Law § 4404]," which effectuates the due process provisions called for by the IDEA (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  Incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4). The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

A CSE convened on August 5, 2022, found the student eligible for special education as a student with a speech or language impairment, and developed an IESP for the student for the 2022-23 school year (kindergarten) (see Parent Ex. I at pp. 1, 11).[1]  The August 2022 CSE recommended that the student receive five periods per week of group special education teacher support services (SETSS) delivered in Yiddish and two 30-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy delivered in Yiddish (id. at p. 8).[2]  The IESP noted that the student was be parentally placed in a nonpublic school (id. at pp. 10-11).

The hearing record includes a form, signed by the parents on May 30, 2023, by which the parents stated that they had placed the student at a nonpublic school at their own expense and requested that the district provide the student with special education services for the 2023-24 school year (Parent Ex. F).

In a letter to the district, dated August 27, 2023, the parents, via a lay advocate, alleged that the district had not provided the student with a qualified special education teacher or related services for the 2022-23 school year, that the district did not assist the parent in finding a qualified SETSS provider or related services provider for the student, and that the student had been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2023-24 school year (Parent Ex. B at pp. 1-2).  The parents stated their intent to seek "prospective/direct funding for SETSS and [related services authorizations (RSAs)] for all other related services" for the 2023-24 school year (id. at p. 2).

On September 1, 2023, the parents signed a contract with Tutorial Plus Inc. (Tutorial Plus) to provide the student with five hours per week of SETSS at a rate of $175 per hour for the 2023-24 school year (Parent Ex. C).

A. Due Process Complaint Notice

In a due process complaint notice dated November 12, 2024, the parents alleged that the district failed to provide the student with a FAPE for the 2023-24 school year (Parent Ex. A at p. 1).  The parents alleged that the district failed to create an IESP for the student for the 2023-24 school year, the district did not assign the student a provider to deliver SETSS, the parents were unable to locate a provider to service the student at the district's standard rate, and, therefore, the parents located a provider to deliver SETSS to the student at an enhanced rate (id. at p. 2).  The parents requested an order for the district to directly fund the student's SETSS provided by Tutorial Plus and an order for the district to issue an RSA for two 30-minute sessions per week of speech-language therapy (id. at pp. 2-3).

In a due process response dated November 18, 2024, the district generally denied the allegations contained in the due process complaint notice, stated its intent to raise certain affirmative defenses, including the parent's failure to provide a written request to the district for equitable services by June 1 as required by Education Law §3602-c, and attached a prior notice summarizing recommendations made at a May 6, 2024 CSE meeting (Due Process Response).

B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision

An impartial hearing convened before an IHO with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on April 2, 2025 (Tr. pp. 1-50).  In a written opening statement, the district argued that the parents' due process complaint notice should be dismissed on the grounds that the IHO lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the parents' claims (Dist. Ex. 6 at pp. 1-2).  The district also alleged that there was "no evidence" that the parents submitted a written request for equitable services by June 1, 2023 (id. at p. 3).  Finally, the district argued that, if an award was deemed warranted, the IHO should "consider the appropriateness of the provider's rate for services (id. at p. 2).

In a decision dated April 11, 2025, the IHO found that the district failed to provide the student a FAPE on an equitable basis for the 2023-24 school year (IHO Decision at pp. 3, 5).  With respect to the district's defense pertaining to the June 1 notice, the IHO noted that the hearing record included the parents' written notice, dated May 30, 2023, and found that the district did not effectively rebut the parents' evidence but rather "presented a speculative argument that the letter was not transmitted" (id. at p. 5).  The IHO further noted that the district did not present evidence that it did not receive the parents' June 1st letter (id.).  Having found that the student was entitled to equitable services, the IHO noted that there was no dispute that district did not "create or implement any program" for the student for the 2023-24 school year (id.).

The IHO treated the parent's requested relief as compensatory education but noted that relief in the form of "out-of-pocket educational expenses incurred by a parent" must be "an appropriate remedy" (IHO Decision at p. 4-5).  The IHO went on to find that services delivered by Tutorial Plus were not appropriate for the student (id. at p. 6).  The IHO did not find the student's SETSS provider to be a credible witness, noting that the SETSS provider's testimony contradicted the 2023-24 student's SETSS progress report, did not offer specific information regarding how the student's deficits were addressed, and was unable to describe the student's abilities (id.).  The IHO denied the parent's request for direct funding (id.).  However the IHO ordered the district to fund 180 hours of bilingual SETSS and 36 hours of bilingual speech-language therapy at a market rate not to exceed $125 per hour to fulfill the student's IESP mandate for the 10-month 2023-24 school year (id. at p. 7).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

The district appeals, arguing that the IHO lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the parents' claims.  The district also argues that the IHO erred in finding that the parents had requested equitable services by June 1, 2023 because the parents failed to prove that they transmitted their written notice to the district.  In addition, the district alleges that the IHO erred in awarding the parent any relief because the IHO correctly found that the parents failed to prove the appropriateness of the unilaterally obtained private services.

The parents did not submit an answer to the district's appeal.

V. Applicable Standards

A board of education must offer a FAPE to each student with a disability residing in the school district who requires special education services or programs (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][1][A]; Educ. Law § 4402[2][a], [b][2]).  However, the IDEA confers no individual entitlement to special education or related services upon students who are enrolled by their parents in nonpublic schools (see 34 CFR 300.137[a]).  Although districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process for making special education services available to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools, such students are not individually entitled under the IDEA to receive some or all of the special education and related services they would receive if enrolled in a public school (see 34 CFR 300.134, 300.137[a], [c], 300.138[b]).

However, under State law, parents of a student with a disability who have privately enrolled their child in a nonpublic school may seek to obtain educational "services" for their child by filing a request for such services in the public school district of location where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]).[3]  "Boards of education of all school districts of the state shall furnish services to students who are residents of this state and who attend nonpublic schools located in such school districts, upon the written request of the parent" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][a]).  In such circumstances, the district of location's CSE must review the request for services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  The CSE must "assure that special education programs and services are made available to students with disabilities attending nonpublic schools located within the school district on an equitable basis, as compared to special education programs and services provided to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district (id.).[4]  Thus, under State law an eligible New York State resident student may be voluntarily enrolled by a parent in a nonpublic school, but at the same time the student is also enrolled in the public school district, that is dually enrolled, for the purpose of receiving special education programming under Education Law § 3602-c, dual enrollment services for which a public school district may be held accountable through an impartial hearing.

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 184-85 [2d Cir. 2012]).

VI. Discussion

The district does not dispute the IHO's finding that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2023-24 school year, nor do the parents dispute the IHO's finding that they failed to demonstrate the appropriateness of the unilaterally obtained services.  Accordingly, these findings have become final and binding on the parties and will not be reviewed on appeal (34 CFR 300.514[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]; see M.Z. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1314992, at *6-*7, *10 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013]).

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Initially, it is necessary to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised by the district in its request for review.  Subject matter jurisdiction refers to "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case" (Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 [1998]).  The district argues on appeal that there is no federal right to file a due process claim regarding services recommended in an IESP and New York law confers no right to file a due process complaint notice regarding IESP implementation.  Thus, according to the district, IHOs and SROs lack subject matter jurisdiction with respect to pure IESP implementation claims.

In numerous recent decisions, the undersigned and other SROs have rejected the district's position that IHOs and SROs lack subject matter jurisdiction to address claims related to implementation of equitable services under State law (see, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-127; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-106; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-098; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-077; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-076; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-075; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No.  25-074; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-071; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 25-067; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-620; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-615; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-614; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-612; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-602; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-595; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-594; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-589; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-584; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-572; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-564; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-558; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-547; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-528; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-525; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-512 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-507; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-501; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-498; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-464; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-461; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-460; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-441; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-436; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 24-435; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-392; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-391; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-390; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-388; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 24-386).

Under federal law, all districts are required by the IDEA to participate in a consultation process with nonpublic schools located within the district and develop a services plan for the provision of special education and related services to students who are enrolled privately by their parents in nonpublic schools within the district equal to a proportionate amount of the district's federal funds made available under part B of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][A]; 34 CFR 300.132[b], 300.134, 300.138[b]).  However, the services plan provisions under federal law clarify that "[n]o parentally-placed private school child with a disability has an individual right to receive some or all of the special education and related services that the child would receive if enrolled in a public school" (34 CFR 300.137 [a]).  Additionally, the due process procedures, other than child find, are not applicable for complaints related to a services plan developed pursuant to federal law.

Accordingly, the district's argument under federal law is correct; however, the student did not merely have a services plan developed pursuant to federal law and the parent did not argue that the district failed in the federal consultation process or in the development of a services plan pursuant to federal regulations.

Separate from the services plan envisioned under the IDEA, the New York Education Law affords parents of resident students with disabilities with a State law option that requires a district of location to review a parental request for dual enrollment services and "develop an [IESP] for the student based on the student's individual needs in the same manner and with the same contents as an [IEP]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).[5]

Concerning students who attend nonpublic schools, Education Law § 3602-c provides that "[r]eview of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent or person in parental relation of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of section forty-four hundred four of this chapter" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][b][1]).  It further provides that "[d]ue process complaints relating to compliance of the school district of location with child find requirements, including evaluation requirements, may be brought by the parent or person in parental relation of the student pursuant to section forty-four hundred four of this chapter" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2][c]).

Consistent with the IDEA, Education Law § 4404, which concerns appeal procedures for students with disabilities, provides that a due process complaint notice may be presented with respect to "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of the student or the provision of a [FAPE]" (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]).  SROs have in the past, taking into account the text and legislative history of Education Law § 3602-c, concluded that the legislature has not eliminated a parent's ability to challenge the district's implementation of equitable services under Education Law § 3602-c through the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404 (see Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121; Application of the Dep't of Educ., Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068).[6]  In addition, the New York Court of Appeals has explained that students authorized to receive dual enrollment services pursuant to Education Law § 3602-c are considered part-time public school students under State Law (Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 184 [1988]; see also L. Off. of Philippe J. Gerschel v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2025 WL 466973, at *4-*6 [S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2025]), which further supports the conclusion that part-time public school students are entitled to the same legal protections found in the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404.[7]

After legislative amendments took effect in 2007, the State Education Department issued guidance further interpreting Education Law § 3602-c to provide that "[a] parent of a student who is a [New York State] resident who disagrees with the individual evaluation, eligibility determination, recommendations of the CSE on the IESP and/or the provision of special education services may submit a Due Process Complaint Notice to the school district of location" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007 – Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3206-c," Attachment 1 at p. 5, VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007] [emphasis added], https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/special-education/memo/chapter-378-laws-2007-guidance-on-nonpublic-placements-memo-september-2007.pdf).

The number of disputes involving the dual enrollment statute statewide remained very small until only a handful of years ago.  In the last several years, the number of due process filings dramatically increased to tens of thousands per year within certain regions of this school district.  As a result, public agencies and parents began to grapple with addressing these circumstances within the district.[8]

In its request for review the district contends that, under the Education Law, there is not, and never has been, a right to bring a complaint for the implementation of IESP claims or enhanced rate services.  Consistent in part with the district's position, State guidance issued in August 2024 noted that the State Education Department had previously "conveyed" to the district that:

parents have never had the right to file a due process complaint to request an enhanced rate for equitable services or dispute whether a rate charged by a licensed provider is consistent with the program in a student's IESP or aligned with the current market rate for such services.  Therefore, such claims should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, whether they were filed before or after the date of the regulatory amendment.

("Special Education Due Process Hearings - Rate Disputes," Office of Special Educ. [Aug. 2024]).[9]  However, the guidance was issued in conjunction with a regulation that was adopted on an emergency basis and has since lapsed.

Case law has not addressed the issue of whether Education Law § 3602-c imposes limitations on the right to an impartial hearing under Education Law § 4404 such as precluding due process complaints on the implementation of an IESP or whether certain types of relief available under § 4404 are repudiated by the due process provisions of § 3602-c.  Instead, case law has carved out a narrow exception that provides that exhaustion is not required if the "plaintiff's claim is limited to the allegation that 'a school has failed to implement services that were specified or otherwise clearly stated in an IEP'"  (Levine v. Greece Cent. Sch. Dist., 353 F. App'x 461, 465 [2d Cir. 2009]; quoting Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 489 [2d Cir. 2002] see Intravaia v. Rocky Point Union Free Sch. Dist., 919 F. Supp. 2d 285, 294 [E.D.N.Y. 2013]).

More recently, the New York State Supreme Court has also signaled that administrative exhaustion is not required, indicating that, if the district fails to implement the services listed on their child's IESP, the parents seeking an enhanced rate apply to the district's Enhanced Rate Equitable Services (ERES) unit, and the requested rates are denied, the parents could seek judicial review (Agudath Israel of America v. New York State Bd. of Regents, No. 909589-24, slip op. at 7 [Sup. Ct., Albany, County, July 11, 2025]).  However, the Court did not address whether parents must use the ERES procedure or whether they may also utilize the administrative due process procedures.  Instead, the Court denied petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction as moot because they sought to enjoin a State regulation that had lapsed (Agudath Israel of America, No. 909589-24, slip op. at 6).  The Court further denied their request for a permanent injunction because the ERES procedure and subsequent opportunity for judicial review provided "an adequate remedy at law" (id. at 7).  The Court acknowledged that all parties believed the backlog in resolving the large number of "enhanced rate" cases in due process proceedings is "a significant problem" but did not resolve the parties' disagreement as to whether rate disputes could be resolved under the text of Education Law § 3602-c (id. at p. 7).[10]  Although petitioners contended that the ERES unit was not equipped to address enhanced rate requests, the Court also declined to address that issue because the district was not a party to the litigation (id.).

Thus, case law has established that within the district, parents may use the ERES procedures and seek judicial review regarding the lack of implementation of the services in a child's IESP, particularly where the due process complaint is limited to that issue and the cost of such services; however, the Court declined to hold that the dual enrollment statute precludes parents from using the due process procedures in Education Law § 4404 to resolve the dispute set forth in this case.  Accordingly, the district's appeal seeking a dismissal on the ground that the IHO and SRO lack subject matter jurisdiction to determine the merits of the parent's claims must be denied.

B. June 1 Deadline

With respect to the district's appeal of the IHO's finding that the parents timely submitted a request for equitable services, the State's dual enrollment statute requires parents of a New York State resident student with a disability who is parentally placed in a nonpublic school and for whom the parents seek to obtain educational services to file a request for such services in the district where the nonpublic school is located on or before the first day of June preceding the school year for which the request for services is made (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2]).

Initially, I note that, although the district would generally have the burden of proof on an affirmative defense, the district is not necessarily required to prove a negative (see Mejia v. Banks, 2024 WL 4350866, at *6 [SDNY Sept. 30, 2024] ["it is unclear how the school district could have proved such a negative"]).  Instead, once the district raised the defense, it was incumbent upon the parents to submit evidence that they provided written notice to the district.  The district raised the June 1 defense in its response to the due process complaint notice, in its written opening statement, and during its closing statement presented during the impartial hearing (see Tr. p. 36; Dist. Ex. 6 Due Process Response).[11]

As the IHO noted, the hearing record includes a form signed and dated by the parents on May 30, 2023, purporting to notify the district that the parents were seeking equitable services for the student who would be attending a nonpublic school at the parents' expense (Parent Ex. F).  However, the document in evidence bears no address or salutation and is not accompanied by any evidence that it was transmitted to the district (id.).  Nor did the parents present testimony during the impartial hearing regarding the transmittal of the notice.[12]  During the impartial hearing, the district specifically argued that there was no evidence that the May 30, 2023 notice was ever sent to the district and noted that the parents had "elected not to appear at the hearing" and, therefore, could not be questioned "regarding the date or method by which their alleged June 1st notice was transmitted" (Tr. p. 36).  In response, the parents did not request an opportunity to supplement the hearing record with proof of transmission or seek and adjournment to present the parent's testimony.  Nor have the parents set forth their position in this appeal by submitting an answer.  Instead, during the impartial hearing, the parents' advocate argued that the district was required to prove that it did not receive the notice.  However, as set forth above, the parents' position is without merit (Tr. p. 42).

Accordingly, given the defense as presented, the parents did not offer sufficient evidence to establish that they submitted a written request for services to the district prior to June 1, 2023 and, therefore, the IHO erred in finding that the district was required to provide services to the student for the 2023-24 school year under the dual enrollment statute and the parents are not entitled to relief on their claims for that school year.

VII. Conclusion

I have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find that I need not address them in light of my decision herein.

THE APPEAL IS SUSTAINED.

IT IS ORDERED that the IHO's decision, dated April 11, 2025, is modified by reversing those portions which found that the district was required to provide the student with equitable services and which ordered a bank of compensatory SETSS and speech language therapy services.

 

[1] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with a speech or language impairment is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][11]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][11]).

[2] SETSS is not defined in the State continuum of special education services (see 8 NYCRR 200.6).  As has been laid out in prior administrative proceedings, the term is not used anywhere other than within this school district and a static and reliable definition of "SETSS" does not exist within the district.

[3] State law provides that "services" includes "education for students with disabilities," which means "special educational programs designed to serve persons who meet the definition of children with disabilities set forth in [Education Law § 4401(1)]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[1][a], [d]).

[4] State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007–Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c," Attachment 1 (Questions and Answers), VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available at https://www.nysed.gov/special-education/guidance-parentally-placed-nonpublic-elementary-and-secondary-school-students).  The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.).  The guidance has recently been reorganized on the State's web site and the paginated pdf versions of the documents previously available do not currently appear there, having been updated with web based versions.

[5] This provision is separate and distinct from the State's adoption of statutory language effectuating the federal requirement that the district of location "expend a proportionate amount of its federal funds made available under part B of the individuals with disabilities education act for the provision of services to students with disabilities attending such nonpublic schools" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2-a]).

[6] In 2004, the State Legislature amended subdivision two of the Education Law § 3602-c, effective June 1, 2005 (see L. 2004, ch. 474 § 2 [Sept. 21, 2004]).  Prior to such date, the subdivision read, in part, as follows:

Review of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent, guardian or persons legally having custody of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of section forty-four hundred four of this chapter.  Such school district shall contract with the school district in which the nonpublic school attended by the pupil is located, for the provision of services pursuant to this section.  The failure or refusal of a board of education to provide such services in accordance with a proper request shall be reviewable only by the commissioner upon an appeal brought pursuant to the provisions of section three hundred ten of this chapter.

(L. 1990, ch. 53 § 49 [June 6, 1990] [emphasis added]).  The amendments that took effect on June 1, 2005, removed the last sentence of subdivision two relating to the review of a board of education's failure or refusal to provide equitable services by the Commissioner (L. 2004, ch. 474 § 2).  A review of the statute's history and the New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation shows that the Legislature intended to remove the language that an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Education Law § 310 was the exclusive vehicle for review of the refusal or failure of a board of education to provide services in accordance with Education Law § 3602-c, as the earlier sentence in subdivision two of such section authorized review by an SRO from a district CSE's determination in accordance with Education Law  § 4404 (Sponsor's Memo., Bill Jacket, L. 2004, ch. 474).  The Memorandum further explained:

The language providing for review of a school district's failure or refusal to provide services ONLY in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Education Law § 310 is unnecessary, confusing and in conflict with the earlier language authorizing review by a State review officer pursuant to § 4404(2) of the Education Law of a committee on special education's determination on review of a request for services by the parent of a nonpublic school student.  At the time it was enacted, the Commissioner of Education conducted State-level review of an impartial hearing officer's decision under § 4404(2) of the Education Law in an appeal brought under § 310 of the Education Law, but that is no longer the case.  The Commissioner has jurisdiction under Education Law § 310 to review the actions or omissions of school district officials generally, so it is unnecessary to provide for such review in § 3602-c and, now that a State review officer conducts reviews under section 4404 (2), it is misleading to have the statute assert that an appeal to the Commissioner is the exclusive remedy.

(Sponsor's Memo., Bill Jacket, L. 2004, ch. 474).  Thus, the legislative amendments were intended to clarify the forum where disputes could be brought, not to eliminate a parent's ability to challenge the district's implementation of equitable services under Education Law § 3602-c through the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404.

[7] The State Education Department treated dually enrolled students as attending other nonpublic institutions but also enrolled in the public school, provided parents requested services each year prior to June 1.  For example:

Questions and Answers

1. What does "dual enrollment" mean?

Dual enrollment means that pupils enrolled in nonpublic schools may also be considered as enrolled in the public school in occupational education programs, gifted education programs, and programs for students with disabilities.

("Dual Enrollment Programs," available at https://www.p12.nysed.gov/nonpub/handbookonservices/ dualenrollment.html).

[8] In May 2024, the State Education Department proposed amendments to 8 NYCRR 200.5 "to clarify that parents of students who are parentally placed in nonpublic schools do not have the right under Education Law § 3602-c to file a due process complaint regarding the implementation of services recommended on an IESP" (see "Proposed Amendment of Section 200.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education Relating to Special Education Due Process Hearings," SED Mem. [May 2024], available at https://www.regents.nysed.gov/sites/regents/files/524p12d2revised.pdf).  Ultimately, however, the proposed regulation was not adopted.  In July 2024, the Board of Regents adopted, by emergency rulemaking, an amendment of 8 NYCRR 200.5, which provides that a parent may not file a due process complaint notice in a dispute "over whether a rate charged by a licensed provider is consistent with the program in a student's IESP or aligned with the current market rate for such services" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]); however enforcement was barred under a temporary restraining order (see Agudath Israel of America v. New York State Bd. of Regents, No. 909589-24, Order to Show Cause [Sup. Ct., Albany County, Oct. 4, 2024]), and the regulation has since lapsed.

[9] Neither the guidance nor the district indicated if this jurisdictional viewpoint was conveyed publicly or only privately to the district, when it was communicated, or to whom.  There was no public expression of these points that the undersigned was aware of until policymakers began rulemaking activities in May 2024; however, as the number of allegations that the district's CSEs had not been convening and services were not being delivered began to mount, the district then began to respond with unsuccessful jurisdictional arguments to SROs, resulting in decisions which were subject to judicial review but went unchallenged (see e.g.Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068).  The guidance document is no longer available on the State's website; however, it has been added to the administrative hearing record.

[10] There is no definition of an "enhanced rate" much less an enhanced rate dispute, and many cases brought before the Office of State Review that one or both of the parties and/or the IHO characterize as an enhanced rate dispute involve a variety of alleged infractions by the district beyond the district's failure to implement services on an IESP, such as allegations that the district failed to convene a CSE to develop an IESP or that the IESP developed was not appropriate for the student.

[11] The issue of the June 1 deadline fits with other affirmative defenses, such as the defense of the statute of limitations, which are required to be raised at the initial hearing (see M.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304, 306 [S.D.N.Y. 2014] [holding that the limitations defense is "subject to the doctrine of waiver if not raised at the initial administrative hearing" and that where a district does "not raise the statute of limitations at the initial due process hearing, the argument has been waived"]; see also R.B. v. Dep't of Educ. of the City of New York, 2011 WL 4375694, at *4-*6 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011] [noting that the IDEA "requir[es] parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level" and holding that a district had not waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in a response to the due process complaint notice where the district articulated its position prior to the impartial hearing]; Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 216 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103 [E.D.N.Y. 2002] [noting that "any argument that could be raised in an administrative setting, should be raised in that setting"]).  "By requiring parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level, IDEA 'affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.'" (R.B., 2011 WL 4375694, at *6, quoting Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 19 [E.D.N.Y. 1995] and Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 [9th Cir. 1992]; see C.D. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 4914722, at *12 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011]).

[12] The parents' advocate withdrew the parent's direct testimony by affidavit as the parent was not available to appear for cross-examination (see Tr. p. 11; see also 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][vii][f] [providing that an IHO may take direct testimony by affidavit in lieu of in-hearing testimony, provided that the witness giving such testimony shall be made available for cross examination]).

PDF Version

[1] The student's eligibility for special education as a student with a speech or language impairment is not in dispute (see 34 CFR 300.8[c][11]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[zz][11]).

[2] SETSS is not defined in the State continuum of special education services (see 8 NYCRR 200.6).  As has been laid out in prior administrative proceedings, the term is not used anywhere other than within this school district and a static and reliable definition of "SETSS" does not exist within the district.

[3] State law provides that "services" includes "education for students with disabilities," which means "special educational programs designed to serve persons who meet the definition of children with disabilities set forth in [Education Law § 4401(1)]" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[1][a], [d]).

[4] State guidance explains that providing services on an "equitable basis" means that "special education services are provided to parentally placed nonpublic school students with disabilities in the same manner as compared to other students with disabilities attending public or nonpublic schools located within the school district" ("Chapter 378 of the Laws of 2007–Guidance on Parentally Placed Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary School Students with Disabilities Pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2004 and New York State (NYS) Education Law Section 3602-c," Attachment 1 (Questions and Answers), VESID Mem. [Sept. 2007], available at https://www.nysed.gov/special-education/guidance-parentally-placed-nonpublic-elementary-and-secondary-school-students).  The guidance document further provides that "parentally placed nonpublic students must be provided services based on need and the same range of services provided by the district of location to its public school students must be made available to nonpublic students, taking into account the student's placement in the nonpublic school program" (id.).  The guidance has recently been reorganized on the State's web site and the paginated pdf versions of the documents previously available do not currently appear there, having been updated with web based versions.

[5] This provision is separate and distinct from the State's adoption of statutory language effectuating the federal requirement that the district of location "expend a proportionate amount of its federal funds made available under part B of the individuals with disabilities education act for the provision of services to students with disabilities attending such nonpublic schools" (Educ. Law § 3602-c[2-a]).

[6] In 2004, the State Legislature amended subdivision two of the Education Law § 3602-c, effective June 1, 2005 (see L. 2004, ch. 474 § 2 [Sept. 21, 2004]).  Prior to such date, the subdivision read, in part, as follows:

Review of the recommendation of the committee on special education may be obtained by the parent, guardian or persons legally having custody of the pupil pursuant to the provisions of section forty-four hundred four of this chapter.  Such school district shall contract with the school district in which the nonpublic school attended by the pupil is located, for the provision of services pursuant to this section.  The failure or refusal of a board of education to provide such services in accordance with a proper request shall be reviewable only by the commissioner upon an appeal brought pursuant to the provisions of section three hundred ten of this chapter.

(L. 1990, ch. 53 § 49 [June 6, 1990] [emphasis added]).  The amendments that took effect on June 1, 2005, removed the last sentence of subdivision two relating to the review of a board of education's failure or refusal to provide equitable services by the Commissioner (L. 2004, ch. 474 § 2).  A review of the statute's history and the New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation shows that the Legislature intended to remove the language that an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Education Law § 310 was the exclusive vehicle for review of the refusal or failure of a board of education to provide services in accordance with Education Law § 3602-c, as the earlier sentence in subdivision two of such section authorized review by an SRO from a district CSE's determination in accordance with Education Law  § 4404 (Sponsor's Memo., Bill Jacket, L. 2004, ch. 474).  The Memorandum further explained:

The language providing for review of a school district's failure or refusal to provide services ONLY in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education under Education Law § 310 is unnecessary, confusing and in conflict with the earlier language authorizing review by a State review officer pursuant to § 4404(2) of the Education Law of a committee on special education's determination on review of a request for services by the parent of a nonpublic school student.  At the time it was enacted, the Commissioner of Education conducted State-level review of an impartial hearing officer's decision under § 4404(2) of the Education Law in an appeal brought under § 310 of the Education Law, but that is no longer the case.  The Commissioner has jurisdiction under Education Law § 310 to review the actions or omissions of school district officials generally, so it is unnecessary to provide for such review in § 3602-c and, now that a State review officer conducts reviews under section 4404 (2), it is misleading to have the statute assert that an appeal to the Commissioner is the exclusive remedy.

(Sponsor's Memo., Bill Jacket, L. 2004, ch. 474).  Thus, the legislative amendments were intended to clarify the forum where disputes could be brought, not to eliminate a parent's ability to challenge the district's implementation of equitable services under Education Law § 3602-c through the due process procedures set forth in Education Law § 4404.

[7] The State Education Department treated dually enrolled students as attending other nonpublic institutions but also enrolled in the public school, provided parents requested services each year prior to June 1.  For example:

Questions and Answers

1. What does "dual enrollment" mean?

Dual enrollment means that pupils enrolled in nonpublic schools may also be considered as enrolled in the public school in occupational education programs, gifted education programs, and programs for students with disabilities.

("Dual Enrollment Programs," available at https://www.p12.nysed.gov/nonpub/handbookonservices/ dualenrollment.html).

[8] In May 2024, the State Education Department proposed amendments to 8 NYCRR 200.5 "to clarify that parents of students who are parentally placed in nonpublic schools do not have the right under Education Law § 3602-c to file a due process complaint regarding the implementation of services recommended on an IESP" (see "Proposed Amendment of Section 200.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education Relating to Special Education Due Process Hearings," SED Mem. [May 2024], available at https://www.regents.nysed.gov/sites/regents/files/524p12d2revised.pdf).  Ultimately, however, the proposed regulation was not adopted.  In July 2024, the Board of Regents adopted, by emergency rulemaking, an amendment of 8 NYCRR 200.5, which provides that a parent may not file a due process complaint notice in a dispute "over whether a rate charged by a licensed provider is consistent with the program in a student's IESP or aligned with the current market rate for such services" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]); however enforcement was barred under a temporary restraining order (see Agudath Israel of America v. New York State Bd. of Regents, No. 909589-24, Order to Show Cause [Sup. Ct., Albany County, Oct. 4, 2024]), and the regulation has since lapsed.

[9] Neither the guidance nor the district indicated if this jurisdictional viewpoint was conveyed publicly or only privately to the district, when it was communicated, or to whom.  There was no public expression of these points that the undersigned was aware of until policymakers began rulemaking activities in May 2024; however, as the number of allegations that the district's CSEs had not been convening and services were not being delivered began to mount, the district then began to respond with unsuccessful jurisdictional arguments to SROs, resulting in decisions which were subject to judicial review but went unchallenged (see e.g.Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-121; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-069; Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 23-068).  The guidance document is no longer available on the State's website; however, it has been added to the administrative hearing record.

[10] There is no definition of an "enhanced rate" much less an enhanced rate dispute, and many cases brought before the Office of State Review that one or both of the parties and/or the IHO characterize as an enhanced rate dispute involve a variety of alleged infractions by the district beyond the district's failure to implement services on an IESP, such as allegations that the district failed to convene a CSE to develop an IESP or that the IESP developed was not appropriate for the student.

[11] The issue of the June 1 deadline fits with other affirmative defenses, such as the defense of the statute of limitations, which are required to be raised at the initial hearing (see M.G. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304, 306 [S.D.N.Y. 2014] [holding that the limitations defense is "subject to the doctrine of waiver if not raised at the initial administrative hearing" and that where a district does "not raise the statute of limitations at the initial due process hearing, the argument has been waived"]; see also R.B. v. Dep't of Educ. of the City of New York, 2011 WL 4375694, at *4-*6 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011] [noting that the IDEA "requir[es] parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level" and holding that a district had not waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in a response to the due process complaint notice where the district articulated its position prior to the impartial hearing]; Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 216 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103 [E.D.N.Y. 2002] [noting that "any argument that could be raised in an administrative setting, should be raised in that setting"]).  "By requiring parties to raise all issues at the lowest administrative level, IDEA 'affords full exploration of technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.'" (R.B., 2011 WL 4375694, at *6, quoting Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14, 19 [E.D.N.Y. 1995] and Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 [9th Cir. 1992]; see C.D. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 4914722, at *12 [S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011]).

[12] The parents' advocate withdrew the parent's direct testimony by affidavit as the parent was not available to appear for cross-examination (see Tr. p. 11; see also 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][vii][f] [providing that an IHO may take direct testimony by affidavit in lieu of in-hearing testimony, provided that the witness giving such testimony shall be made available for cross examination]).