I. Introduction

This proceeding arises under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) and Article 89 of the New York State Education Law.  Petitioners (the parents) appeal from a decision of an impartial hearing officer (IHO) which partially denied their request that respondent (the district) fully fund the costs of their son's tuition at the Children's Academy for the 2024-25 extended school year.  The appeal must be sustained.

II. Overview—Administrative Procedures

When a student in New York is eligible for special education services, the IDEA calls for the creation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is delegated to a local Committee on Special Education (CSE) that includes, but is not limited to, parents, teachers, a school psychologist, and a district representative (Educ. Law § 4402; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414[d][1][A]-[B]; 34 CFR 300.320, 300.321; 8 NYCRR 200.3, 200.4[d][2]).  If disputes occur between parents and school districts, incorporated among the procedural protections is the opportunity to engage in mediation, present State complaints, and initiate an impartial due process hearing (20 U.S.C. §§ 1221e-3, 1415[e]-[f]; Educ. Law § 4404[1]; 34 CFR 300.151-300.152, 300.506, 300.511; 8 NYCRR 200.5[h]-[l]).

New York State has implemented a two-tiered system of administrative review to address disputed matters between parents and school districts regarding "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a student with a disability, or a student suspected of having a disability, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such student" (8 NYCRR 200.5[i][1]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[b][6]-[7]; 34 CFR 300.503[a][1]-[2], 300.507[a][1]).  First, after an opportunity to engage in a resolution process, the parties appear at an impartial hearing conducted at the local level before an IHO (Educ. Law § 4404[1][a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j]).  An IHO typically conducts a trial-type hearing regarding the matters in dispute in which the parties have the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and certain other individuals with special knowledge or training; present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; prohibit the introduction of any evidence at the hearing that has not been disclosed five business days before the hearing; and obtain a verbatim record of the proceeding (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][2][A], [h][1]-[3]; 34 CFR 300.512[a][1]-[4]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][3][v], [vii], [xii]).  The IHO must render and transmit a final written decision in the matter to the parties not later than 45 days after the expiration period or adjusted period for the resolution process (34 CFR 300.510[b][2], [c], 300.515[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  A party may seek a specific extension of time of the 45-day timeline, which the IHO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5]).  The decision of the IHO is binding upon both parties unless appealed (Educ. Law § 4404[1]).

A party aggrieved by the decision of an IHO may subsequently appeal to a State Review Officer (SRO) (Educ. Law § 4404[2]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415[g][1]; 34 CFR 300.514[b][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k]).  The appealing party or parties must identify the findings, conclusions, and orders of the IHO with which they disagree and indicate the relief that they would like the SRO to grant (8 NYCRR 279.4).  The opposing party is entitled to respond to an appeal or cross-appeal in an answer (8 NYCRR 279.5).  The SRO conducts an impartial review of the IHO's findings, conclusions, and decision and is required to examine the entire hearing record; ensure that the procedures at the hearing were consistent with the requirements of due process; seek additional evidence if necessary; and render an independent decision based upon the hearing record (34 CFR 300.514[b][2]; 8 NYCRR 279.12[a]).  The SRO must ensure that a final decision is reached in the review and that a copy of the decision is mailed to each of the parties not later than 30 days after the receipt of a request for a review, except that a party may seek a specific extension of time of the 30-day timeline, which the SRO may grant in accordance with State and federal regulations (34 CFR 300.515[b], [c]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[k][2]).

III. Facts and Procedural History

The parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this matter and the IHO's decision is presumed and will not be recited in detail.

Briefly, from October 2022 through January 2023, the then four-year-old student was evaluated by a private clinical psychologist and received diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, combined type (ADHD)- mild severity, developmental motor coordination disorder- mild severity, and language disorder, with symptoms falling in the moderate range for receptive language and the severe range for expressive language (Parent Ex. E at pp. 1, 15).

The CSE convened in April and May 2023, to conduct the student's annual review, as he transitioned from preschool special education services to school-aged special education services as a kindergartener (Dist. Exs. 1; 3).  The CSE found the student eligible for special education as a student with a speech or language impairment and developed an IEP for the student for the 2023-24 school year with an implementation date of September 1, 2023 (see id.).  The May 2023 CSE recommended that the student attend a 10-month program where he would receive  integrated co-teaching services 10 times per week for English language arts (ELA), and five times per week for math, social studies, and sciences, all in a general education classroom (Dist. Ex. 1 at pp. 14-15).  For related services, the CSE recommended the student receive one 30- minute session per week of group (3:1) counseling services, one 30-minute session per week of individual occupational therapy (OT), one 30-minute session per week of group (2:1) OT, two 30-minute sessions per week of individual physical therapy (PT), two 30-minute sessions per week of individual speech-language therapy, and one 30-minute session per week of group (2:1) speech-language therapy (id. at p. 15).  The CSE also recommended an assistive technology device and special transportation services (id. at pp. 16, 20).

On April 9, 2024, the parents electronically signed an enrollment contract for the student to attend Children's Academy for the 2024-25 school year as a first-grade student (Parent Ex. J).  According to the contract, the tuition "for the 10-month academic year from September 2024 through August 2025 [wa]s $103,643.75"; however, the full cost of the student's tuition was listed as $124,372.50 (Parent Ex. J at p. 2).

The parents filed a due process complaint notice for the 2023-24 school year, and, in a decision issued June 17, 2024, an IHO found the district failed to provide the student with a free appropriate public education (FAPE), found the unilateral placement of the student at Children's Academy was appropriate, and ordered the district to reimburse the parents for tuition for the 10-month program at Children's Academy and provide the student with round trip transportation to and from Children's Academy for the 2023-24 school year(see Parent Exs. B at p. 2; D).

In a letter dated June 26, 2024, the parents stated the district had failed to convene a CSE meeting, create an IEP, or recommend a public or nonpublic school placement for the 2024-25 school year; therefore, they were notifying the district of their intent to unilaterally place the student at Children's Academy for the 12-month 2024-25 school year and seek public funding (Parent Ex. B at p. 2).  They also requested transportation to and from Children's Academy (id.).

A. Due Process Complaint Notice

In a due process complaint notice dated July 10, 2024, the parents alleged that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 extended school year by failing to convene a CSE meeting and by failing to offer the student a public school placement (Parent Ex. A ¶ 24).  For relief, the parents requested that the student be awarded, as pendency, the costs of the student's tuition at Children's Academy based on the prior IHO's June 17, 2024 decision, a finding that the student was denied a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year, and reimbursement or direct funding for tuition at Children's Academy for the 2024-25 extended school year and door-to-door transportation (id. ¶¶ 29, 31).

B. Impartial Hearing Officer Decision

After three prehearing conferences (Aug. 21, 2024 Tr. pp. 1-16; Sept. 18, 2024 Tr. pp. 17-33; Oct. 21, 2024 pp. 1-12), an impartial hearing convened before an IHO with the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) on January 8, 2025 (Jan. 8, 2025 Tr. pp. 13-70).  In an interim decision on pendency dated September 27, 2024, the IHO concluded that the prior unappealed IHO decision, dated June 17, 2024, established the student's current educational program and ordered the district to provide tuition to Children's Academy for a 10-month school year and round trip transportation, during the pendency of the proceedings, retroactive to July 10, 2024 when the parents filed their due process complaint notice (Interim IHO Decision).

In a final decision, dated February 19, 2025, the IHO found that the district failed to meet its burden of showing that it offered the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year, that the unilaterally obtained program at Children's Academy was appropriate, and that equitable considerations favored the parents (IHO Decision pp. 1, 6-8, 10).  With respect to the IHO's finding that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE, the IHO noted that the district did not present any witnesses to address the parents' allegations and the district conceded it denied the student a FAPE (id. at p. 6).  On the issue of the appropriateness of the unilateral placement, the IHO held that the evidence indicated the student was making meaningful improvement toward his goals and continued to make progress in "his academic, social, physical, and functional abilities" at Children's Academy during the 2024-25 school year (id. at p. 7).  The IHO cited documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the parents to support the IHO's finding that Children's Academy was meeting the student's individual needs and was an appropriate unilateral placement (id. at pp. 7-8).  Finally, the IHO concluded that equitable considerations also favored the parents as they submitted documentation that the district was notified of their intention to unilaterally place the student at Children's Academy should their concerns not be met and the district declined to respond (id. at p. 8).

The IHO awarded relief consistent with reimbursement for the 10-month school year only, citing a lack of proof of substantial regression as the reason for declining to award full reimbursement of the student's tuition costs at Children's Academy for the extended school year (IHO Decision at pp. 8-9).  The IHO cited a lack of testimonial and documentary evidence of substantial regression and that the prior IHO decision dated June 17, 2024 submitted by the parents contradicted their contention that the student required summer services as that decision made specific factual findings that the student had made progress the prior year (2023-24) which was only 10-months (id.).  The IHO also found there was no testimony as to specific instances or a time period for which "substantial regression" was documented and what specific skills were affected or lost during that time (id. at pp. 9-10).  The IHO concluded that the hearing record did not demonstrate that the student would be unable to continue making progress in a 10-month program (id. at p. 10).

IV. Appeal for State-Level Review

The parents appeal, alleging that the IHO erred in declining to reimburse the parents for the full tuition for the 12-month 2024-25 extended school year.  The parents argue that the IHO ignored the totality of the circumstances and that the parents demonstrated that a 12-month school year was essential for the student to continue to make progress.

In an answer, the district argues that the IHO's decision should be affirmed due to the parents' failure to demonstrate the student required extended school year services.[1]

V. Applicable Standards

Two purposes of the IDEA (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482) are (1) to ensure that students with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living; and (2) to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities and parents of such students are protected (20 U.S.C. § 1400[d][1][A]-[B]; see generally Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239 [2009]; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 [1982]).

A FAPE is offered to a student when (a) the board of education complies with the procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA, and (b) the IEP developed by its CSE through the IDEA's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07; T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151, 160 [2d Cir. 2014]; R.E. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189-90 [2d Cir. 2012]; M.H. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 [2d Cir. 2012]; Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 [2d Cir. 2005]).  "'[A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP'" (Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 [2d Cir. 1998], quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 253 [2d Cir. 2009]).  The Supreme Court has indicated that "[t]he IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.  After all, the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional advancement" (Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 [2017]).  While the Second Circuit has emphasized that school districts must comply with the checklist of procedures for developing a student's IEP and indicated that "[m]ultiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not" (R.E., 694 F.3d at 190-91), the Court has also explained that not all procedural errors render an IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA (M.H., 685 F.3d at 245; A.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 172 [2d Cir. 2009]; Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 381 [2d Cir. 2003]).  Under the IDEA, if procedural violations are alleged, an administrative officer may find that a student did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (a) impeded the student's right to a FAPE, (b) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the student, or (c) caused a deprivation of educational benefits (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][ii]; 34 CFR 300.513[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][4][ii]; Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 [2007]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 190; M.H., 685 F.3d at 245).

The IDEA directs that, in general, an IHO's decision must be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the student received a FAPE (20 U.S.C. § 1415[f][3][E][i]).  A school district offers a FAPE "by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction" (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203).  However, the "IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130; see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).  "The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created" (Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404).  The statute ensures an "appropriate" education, "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents" (Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132, quoting Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 [2d Cir. 1989] [citations omitted]; see Grim, 346 F.3d at 379).  Additionally, school districts are not required to "maximize" the potential of students with disabilities (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 199; Grim, 346 F.3d at 379; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).  Nonetheless, a school district must provide "an IEP that is 'likely to produce progress, not regression,' and . . . affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere 'trivial advancement'" (Cerra, 427 F.3d at 195, quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 [citations omitted]; see T.P., 554 F.3d at 254; P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 118-19 [2d Cir. 2008]).  The IEP must be "reasonably calculated to provide some 'meaningful' benefit" (Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 [2d Cir. 1997]; see Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 [holding that the IDEA "requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances"]; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192).  The student's recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE) (20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][5][A]; 34 CFR 300.114[a][2][i], 300.116[a][2]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[cc], 200.6[a][1]; see Newington, 546 F.3d at 114; Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 108 [2d Cir. 2007]; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132).

An appropriate educational program begins with an IEP that includes a statement of the student's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][1]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][i]), establishes annual goals designed to meet the student's needs resulting from the student's disability and enable him or her to make progress in the general education curriculum (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][2][i], [2][i][A]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][iii]), and provides for the use of appropriate special education services (see 34 CFR 300.320[a][4]; 8 NYCRR 200.4[d][2][v]).[2]

A board of education may be required to reimburse parents for their expenditures for private educational services obtained for a student by his or her parents, if the services offered by the board of education were inadequate or inappropriate, the services selected by the parents were appropriate, and equitable considerations support the parents' claim (Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 [1993]; Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 [1985]; R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85; T.P., 554 F.3d at 252).  In Burlington, the Court found that Congress intended retroactive reimbursement to parents by school officials as an available remedy in a proper case under the IDEA (471 U.S. at 370-71; see Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 111; Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192).  "Reimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).

The burden of proof is on the school district during an impartial hearing, except that a parent seeking tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement has the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of such placement (Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).

VI. Discussion

Initially, I note that neither party appealed the IHO's determinations that the district denied the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year, that the unilateral placement of the student at Children's Academy was appropriate, or that equitable considerations favor the IHO's award of tuition reimbursement for the costs of the student's 10-month tuition at Children's Academy.  Accordingly, these findings have become final and binding on the parties (34 CFR 300.514[a]; 8 NYCRR 200.5[j][5][v]; see M.Z. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2013 WL 1314992, at *6-*7, *10 [S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013]).

The parties' dispute on appeal centers around whether the IHO erred by not awarding the parents reimbursement for the student's tuition costs at Children's Academy for July and August 2024.  On appeal, the parents argue the student is entitled to reimbursement for the 12-month extended school year because the unilateral placement included a 12-month program of services for the 2024-25 school year that the IHO already determined to be appropriate.  The parents argue further that the IHO's decision to bifurcate the award and reduce reimbursement for the extended school year services was error and illogical given the district's concession, during the impartial hearing, that it denied the student a FAPE and the IHO's finding that the program at Children's Academy was appropriate.  The district argues that the parents did not demonstrate extended school year services were required and that the record demonstrates that extended school year services were excessive.

While parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of an appropriate private placement when a district has failed to offer their child a FAPE, it does not follow that they may take advantage of deficiencies in the district's offered placement to obtain all those services they might wish to provide for their child at the expense of the public fisc, as such results do not achieve the purpose of the IDEA.  To the contrary, "[r]eimbursement merely requires [a district] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance" had it offered the student a FAPE (Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71 [emphasis added]; see 20 U.S.C. § 1412[a][10][C][ii]; 34 CFR 300.148).  Accordingly, while a parent should not be denied reimbursement for an appropriate program due to the fact that the program provides benefits in addition to those required for the student to receive educational benefits, a reduction from full reimbursement may be considered where a unilateral placement provides services beyond those required to address a student's educational needs (L.K., 674 Fed. App'x at 101; see C.B. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F. 3d 1155, 1160 [9th Cir. 2011] [indicating that "[e]quity surely would permit a reduction from full reimbursement if [a unilateral private placement] provides too much (services beyond required educational needs), or if it provides some things that do not meet educational needs at all (such as purely recreational options), or if it is overpriced"]; Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 [5th Cir. 1986] ["The Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the [unilateral] placement chosen by the parent is found to be the exact proper placement required under the Act.  Conversely, when [the student] was at the [unilateral placement], he may have received more 'benefit' than the EAHCA [the predecessor statute to the IDEA] requires"]).

In this instance, the IHO determined that the services provided to the student by Children's Academy were appropriate for the 10-month portion of the school year and in addressing the 12-month portion of the program, the IHO noted that the student "may certainly benefit," but districts are not required to "maximize" a student's potential (IHO Decision at p. 6-8, 9).  The IHO then discounted the recommendation for 12-month services contained in the January 2023 neuropsychological evaluation report and the Children's Academy's head of school's testimony that the student required a 12-month program to prevent regression (id. at pp. 9-10).  Factors that the IHO pointed towards weighing against a finding that the student required 12-month services to prevent regression was the Children's Academy's head of school's testimony that the student was successful at Children's Academy during the 2023-24 school year although the student only attended for 10-months and the lack of specific testimony indicating when substantial regression was noted, specific skills the student lost during those periods, or the period of review the student required to recoup skills (id.).   Overall, the IHO found that the hearing record "fail[ed] to show that [the s]tudent would be unable to make progress without a 12-month program" (id. at p. 10).

Consistent with the IHO decision, the district argues that the student did not require 12-month services, asserting that the student only attended a 10-month program during the 2023-24 school year and that there was evidence presented showing that the student make progress with a 10-month program during the prior school year, 2023-24.  The district also adopts the IHO's reasoning that the lack of specific evidence as to the student's regression weighs against granting funding for a 12-month program, asserting that "there is nothing in the record, nor alleged in the [request for review], that the [s]tudent's purported progress is dependent on a 12-month school year.

However, the district and the IHO overlook that the student's education, up until September 2023 was entirely within the district and the district, although responsible for making a determination as to whether the student required 12-month services in the first instance, failed to do so—at least within the documentation submitted as part of the hearing record.  More specifically, according to the available information, the student began attending Children's Academy in September 2023 as a kindergarten student (Parent Ex. T ¶¶19, 21).   Prior to that, the student received special education as a preschool student with a disability (see Parent Exs. E at p. 1; U ¶¶10, 12).  As a preschool student with a disability, the student was entitled to continue to receive special education and related services under the CPSE through summer 2024 (see Educ. Law §§ 3202[1]; 4410[1][i]; 8 NYCRR 200.1[mm][2]). Only after that, beginning in September 2024, would the recommendation made by the May 2023 CSE take effect, with the CSE specifically noting in the IEP that the student was being evaluated "for Kindergarten in the Fall of 2023" (Dist. Ex. 1 at p. 1).  Accordingly, any recommendation for services for the summer portion of the 2023-24 school year would have been made by the CPSE and there is no information in the hearing record as to whether the CPSE met prior to summer 2023 or what transpired during such a meeting.  Further, the parents asserted that the CSE did not convene to recommend a program for the 2024-25 school year (Parent Ex. A at p. 3) and, as the district conceded and did not challenge this allegation, there is no CSE determination as to whether the student required 12-month services to prevent regression for the 2024-25 school year.

It is well-settled that the burden is on the district during an impartial hearing to defend its recommended program, which it declined to do so in this instance (see Educ. Law § 4404[1][c]; see R.E., 694 F.3d at 184-85).  The district, during the impartial hearing conceded that it failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 extended school year (Jan. 8, 2025 Tr. p. 38).  The district did not put forward any evidence that the student did not require a 12-month program despite the parents' due process complaint notice alleging that the district failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 extended school year (see Parent Ex. A at p. 3).  Notably, the hearing record lacks a CPSE IEP for the student, it is unknown what services, if any, the student received in July and August 2023, and for the 2024-25 school year, the CSE never met to review the student's educational program.

The district cannot now argue on appeal that the student was not previously entitled to summer services as the appropriate time to put forward evidence that the student did not require summer services was at the impartial hearing when presenting its case on whether it offered the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year.  While the district now attempts to argue a lack of evidence on the part of the parents or excessiveness, the district cannot support its argument on appeal as there is no possible way to determine on this hearing record what, if anything, the student was receiving during the summer portion of the 2023-24 school year, prior to the student being placed in the nonpublic school, and the district conceded that if failed to offer the student a FAPE for the 2024-25 school year.  Therefore, the parents should have received tuition equal to the entirety of what the IHO determined was an "appropriate" unilateral program for the student.

VII. Conclusion

For all the reasons outlined above, the IHO erred in awarding partial funding for the 12-month program at Children's Academy after the district conceded that it failed to offer the student a FAPE and the IHO found the unilateral placement to be appropriate.  Accordingly, the IHO's order shall be modified to require the district to fully fund the unilateral placement for the 12-month 2024-25 extended school year.

I have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unnecessary to address them in light of my determinations above.

THE APPEAL IS SUSTAINED.

IT IS ORDERED that the IHO decision dated February 19, 2025 is modified by reversing that portion which reduced the parents' reimbursement of tuition to Children's Academy for the 2024-25 school year, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the district shall fully reimburse the parents for the student's tuition at Children's Academy for the 2024-25 12-month extended school year.